Paderewski Variations

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Abstract

How successful are Fregean theories compared with guise-theoretic Millian theories in dealing with a range of problematic propositional attitude ascriptions? The range considered is roughly that of Paderewski puzzles and their relatives. I argue that these fall into two categories: in one category, the Fregean theory looks to be under pressure from guise-theoretic rivals, though I argue that Fregeans can, to advantage, borrow some guise-theoretic machinery. Concerning the other category, which includes Kripke's two Paderewski puzzles, I argue that these puzzles are neutral between Fregean and Millian approaches; more generally, they have no direct bearing on semantics. Their solution requires correct views about rationality, self-knowledge and transparency.

According to Fregeans, Millians have a coarse-grained notion of content that handicaps them in describing our beliefs. For Millians, there is no difference of content among atomic expressions with the same referent. These theorists confront the problem of explaining our confident intuition that people once failed to believe that Hesperus is Phosphorus, even though they believed that Hesperus is Hesperus. By contrast, this is supposed to be an easy case for Fregeans: 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' differ in sense, despite agreeing in referent, so the thought *that Hesperus is Hesperus* differs from the thought *that Hesperus is Phosphorus*. This makes it easy for people to believe the one without believing the other.

On the other hand, Millians appeal to structures of ascription that Fregeans typically do not employ. For example, Nathan Salmon (1986/1991) says that we should regard our ordinary superficially two-place ascriptions of belief as resulting from the existential closure of a three-place relation, BEL, obtaining between a subject, a content and a guise.[1] This gives rise to an extra place for negation. In addition to the wholly external negation, and a content dominated by negation, both of which are recognized by Fregeans, there is a third possibility, which Salmon refers to as withholding belief. The negation occurs just after the claim that there's a guise, so the overall impact is to say that there's a guise such that it's not the case that the subject is BEL-related to the content under that guise. As one might sketch it (with '*s*' for the subject of the belief and '*p*' for the content):

$$\exists x(\text{Guise } x \ \& \ \neg \text{BEL}(s, p, x)).$$

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    [1] The idea traces back to Kaplan (1968).

In a conventional two-place belief relation, there is simply no such position for negation to occupy.

The aim of this paper is to clarify the debate between Fregeans and guise-theoretic Millians by considering how each party could or should treat a series of six examples. The first two, which I'll call Anne–Brad puzzles after their protagonists, invite, or in one case require, the kind of structures that are invoked by guise theorists, but, I argue, these structures can as well be filled by Fregean senses as by guises. The last four puzzles are variations on Kripke's puzzle about Paderewski (Kripke 1979), and these give the paper its title.[2] In most of these last four cases, I argue, the key lies neither in difference of guise nor in difference of sense, nor in anything else traditionally classified as a semantic issue; rather, the key questions relate to more general issues concerning the nature of belief and rationality.

One of these more general issues should be flagged immediately. Both Fregeans and Millians are tempted by a notion of 'transparency'. For Fregeans, this may emerge as the "intuitive criterion of difference" (Evans 1982, 18–19): if a rational subject at a single time takes conflicting attitudes to two sentences she understands, the sentences differ in sense. For guise theorists, it may emerge as the ruling that if a rational subject thinks conflicting things at a single time about a single object, she cannot be thinking about that object under the same guise in both thoughts. Yet if we take the Paderewski puzzle as Kripke presented it, we have counterexamples to both principles: Peter, though rational, takes conflicting attitudes, at a single time, to the very same unambiguous sentence, a sentence that is constant in sense; and although he no doubt thinks of Paderewski under different guises, he also thinks conflicting things of him under the same guise at the same time.[3] This paper provides some support for taking Paderewski puzzles in this way, and shows that in doing so, and in abandoning transparency, we can reach a coherent and systematic account. The question of how the abandonment of transparency affects motivations and arguments for and against classical Fregeanism is deferred to another occasion.

If guises were just Fregean senses under another label, the present investigation would have rather little point. But it is clear that, though both can be vaguely regarded as 'ways of thinking' of something, there are important differences. Guises may be wholly idiosyncratic, whereas Frege's aspiration was that senses would be public and shared. Guises need not be, and typically are not, specified in ascriptions of propositional attitudes, whereas senses typically are, for thoughts, which are structures of senses, are the objects of the attitudes. In particular, an asserted content is a thought for Fregeans, but Millians do not (and, given their

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[2] The first two cases could have been presented as variations on Paderewski. But since I argue that these two require different treatment from the rest, it seemed clearer to use different protagonists.

[3] The same point can be made if the proper objects of guises are Russellian propositions.

other commitments, should not) identify it with a structure of guises. Guises that are guises of nothing are, at the least, problematic for Millian guise theorists, whereas sense without a referent is a familiar Fregean notion.

I will count as Fregean any view that subscribes to the following theses:

- structures of senses (thoughts) are the objects of propositional attitudes
- fine-grained differences among thoughts explain at least some of the Hesperus/Phosphorus type of puzzles
- senses are public and shared
- expressions that differ in sense may have the same referent
- an expression may have a sense but no referent.

One conclusion of the paper is that Fregeans should borrow the structures that guise theorists have made salient, but need not see this as, in itself, any departure from the Fregean principles just listed. A further conclusion is that classical Paderewski puzzles supply no ammunition to either side in the battle between Fregeans and Millians.

1. Anne loves and does not love

Salmon introduces guises as a way of providing a coherent description of who Anne loves according to the following story (I simplify the details, and change the names of the characters):

> *Once upon a time, Anne loved her husband, Brad. But Brad lives a double life, secretly robbing graves by night. Over time, Anne manages to meet the grave-robber, and, not realizing he is Brad, falls in love with him, and falls out of love with her husband.*

We are tempted by the following incoherent description: by the end of the story, Anne both loves and does not love her husband. How should we justify our rejection of this contradiction?

Salmon invites us to replace the two-place relation of *love* by a three-place relation: x loves$'$ y under guise g. We can then represent Anne's state as follows, where 'a' abbreviates 'Anne' and 'b' abbreviates 'Brad':

(*) $\exists g$Loves$'$(a,b,g) & $\exists g \neg$Loves$'$(a,b,g).

Consistency is restored, we can treat the ordinary 'x loves y' as abbreviating '$\exists g$Loves$'$(x,y,g)', and there's something intuitive about regarding love as a state relating a subject to an object not just in itself, but under a guise.

On this view, should we say that Anne does not love her husband? The guise theorist must regard the question as ambiguous. If it is:

$\neg \exists g$Loves$'$(a,b,g)?

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the answer is No, for there is a guise under which she loves him, the *grave-robber* guise. If the question is

$$\exists g \neg Loves'(a,b,g)?$$

the answer is Yes, for under the *my husband* or *Brad* guise she does not love him. This exploits the distinctive position for negation provided by quantification over guises. Both answers are, of course, directly deducible from (*).

I regard this as a good case for guises. But the Fregean can adopt its structural features unchanged, refashioning the Millian's quantification over guises as quantification over senses. He needs then to supply a modest additional gloss concerning the role the senses play in the subject's life. This will address the question of what it is to be related by love to an object and a sense. The obvious answer is that the object must be the Bedeutung of the sense, and thoughts of which the sense is a constituent must be intimately related to the subject's affective states. Thoughts involving that sense help cause and explain the loving state.[4]

For example, the Fregean thought *that her husband is exotic and exciting* is one that Anne does not believe; indeed, she thinks it is false. By contrast, the thought *that the grave-robber is exotic and exciting*, though not distinguishable at the level of reference, is one that she does believe, and this belief gives a loving turn to her emotions. Similarly, the belief that her husband is grey and boring inhibits loving thoughts containing the sense of 'my husband'.

How should we rate the Millian and Fregean responses? Since they are structurally indistinguishable, perhaps we should call it a tie. Millian guises are admittedly underdescribed[5]; but, like Fregean senses, they are designed to play a systematic role in accounts of the nature of mental states and of the semantics of our ascription of them. We have so far been given no reason to prefer one kind of fillings (guises, senses) to another in the shared structures. So the reports of love we have considered so far provide no way of choosing between the rival theories. The question I now address is whether other kinds of report will ground a preference.

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[4] We have some inclination to think of 'love' as extensional: if S loves x and $x=y$ then S loves y. We also have some inclination to think that someone can love, even when there is no real (but only an imaginary) object of the love: it may be that S loves x even though x does not exist. These intuitions are not easy for any theorist to bring into harmony. Millians can easily accommodate the first; Fregeans can easily accommodate the second. Pursuing this issue would take us too far afield.

[5] Salmon recognizes this: "The major problem remaining for the sort of theory I have advocated here is to provide a more complete account of . . . the things that serve as third relatum for the BEL relation" [i.e. guises]" (1986/1991, 126). He sometimes identifies them with personalities (Ib., 104), means by which one is acquainted (Ib.,108), and appearances (Ib., 109).

2. Anne fails to recognize Brad

> *Anne fails to recognize her good friend Brad when she sees him dressed in a gorilla suit.*

This encourages us to take the following ascription to be true:

1.　　　Concerning Brad (the man in the gorilla suit), Anne does not believe that he is Brad.

But, as the story makes plain, Anne knows Brad perfectly well, so we seem also to have:

2.　　　Concerning Brad, Anne believes that he is Brad.

The conjunction of (1) and (2) appears to entail something of this form:

3.　　　Concerning b, he is not *F* and he is *F*,

where '*F*' abbreviates 'is believed by Anne to be Brad'. This entails a contradiction. But the situation is deeply ordinary – it cannot really be contradictory. Moreover, it is a contradiction for us, the ascribers, and not for Anne, the believer. True, we may also be tempted to say that, concerning Brad (the man in the gorilla suit), Anne believes that he is not Brad, which makes her believe a contradiction. I'll return to such cases in subsequent sections (especially section 4), but for now we'll keep to *our* contradiction, as expressed in (3), and justified by (1) and (2).

No matter what interesting things a Fregean may have to say about Anne's mental states, there is no prospect of directly using finer-grained senses to defuse the contradiction. The only way to implement a direct strategy is to claim that (1) and (2) above are best represented as:

Concerning Brad, *p*
Concerning Brad, not *q*

where the sense of '*p*' is distinct from the sense of '*q*', so that the contradiction is blocked. For example:

> Concerning Brad (the man in the gorilla suit), Anne does not believe that he_1 is Brad
> Concerning Brad (the man in the photo), Anne does believe that he_2 is Brad

where the sense of 'he_1' is distinct from the sense of 'he_2'. But this is completely implausible. The whole point of using anaphoric pronouns in such cases is to abstract away from anything like how the subject (Anne) thought of the object

(Brad); and there's no Fregean analogy or principle to justify assigning different senses to anaphoric pronouns that depend on the same head.[6]

The example is reminiscent of one involving Bernard J. Ortcutt, which led Quine (1956) to propose a three-place relation instead of a two-place one. Quine's three places are occupied by a subject, an intension (in a later variant, an expression) and an object. This solution will not work for the present case, since both ascriptions involve the same subject, the same intension (and the same expression) and the same object.

However, a more Salmon-like three-place solution works perfectly:

> Concerning Brad, there is some guise such that, under it, Anne does not believe that he is Brad

and

> Concerning Brad, there is some guise such that, under it, Anne does believe that he is Brad.

I call 'Concerning Brad' a quantifying-in expression (though nothing turns on this terminology); it can bind a variable in what follows. Here is a more schematic representation, with 'b' abbreviating 'Concerning Brad' and 'he$_b$' indicating that the pronoun is dependent upon this expression:

b: $\exists x$(Guise x & $\neg$ BEL(a, *that he$_b$ is Brad, x*))
b: $\exists x$(Guise x & BEL(a, *that he$_b$ is Brad, x*)).

Reducing the structure to the minimum, it's just the obviously non-contradictory

$\exists x F x$ & $\exists x \neg F x$.[7]

There are many ways not to believe a thought. One way is never even to have entertained it. Another is to have consciously entertained it and rejected it; and there are other ways as well. Anne's non-belief is probably of the former kind: under the guise *the man in the gorilla suit*, it's likely that the proposition that he is Brad never occurs to her. (We could vary the story in this respect, envisaging a third party who points at the man in the gorilla suit and asks Anne whether he is Brad.) Guise theory aims to capture non-belief as such, and so it's appropriate for it to refrain from specifying how it obtains.

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[6] In the sentences just displayed, the parenthetical clauses ('the man in the gorilla suit', 'the man in the photo') are simply guides for the reader, not part of the content. The idea is that the sentences would remain true were these clauses deleted. So the pronoun in each case has as head just 'Brad'.

[7] The logical feature that matters here is not being a variable-binding expression, but being a contradiction-defusing one. While there are expressions, like $\diamond$, which defuse contradictions without binding variables, it's unclear that they would have any natural use in the present project.

I claim that a Fregean can and should accept the structure of this proposal though, as in the previous case, not its content: guises will be replaced by senses. One justification for this proposal is the following. Suppose Anne has the following two beliefs, regarded as Fregean thoughts:

> *that man in the gorilla suit is not Brad*
> *that man in the photo is Brad.*

If any states of Anne could justify the contradictory quantifying-in ascription, these would. So Anne's state can be given a perfectly coherent Fregean description, in terms of distinct thoughts. This strongly suggests that here we do not have a puzzle about Anne, but one about the quantifying-in construction.

In de dicto ascriptions of beliefs, Fregeans have no special problem: non-belief is just failing to take the attitude of belief to a Fregean thought. Someone can believe that Hesperus is visible and not believe that Phosphorus is visible because these are distinct Fregean thoughts. What makes the present case more problematic is the de re, quantifying-in, structure, for it prevents us from appealing in this direct way to differences of Fregean sense for the same object, for no specific senses are offered by the example. We need to find a way of quantifying over senses, just as the guise theorist quantifies over guises. Intuitively, what a Fregean should say is that *there is* a Brad-related thought that Anne doesn't believe, and a Brad-related thought that she does, though what these thoughts are is not specified, and they are very intimately related, for they both concern Brad, and predicate the same thing of him.

This idea could be developed by specifying a relation, C, among subject-predicate thoughts each of whose subject-position senses have the object in question as their referent. De re attributions concerning an object o do not specify a full Fregean thought, but quantify over a range of C-related thoughts whose shared referent is o. Then the problematic attributions in (1) and (2) can be understood in the following contradiction-defusing way:

(4)
b: $\exists t$(Thought t & $\neg$ BEL$'$(a, t) & C(t, *that he$_b$ is Brad*))
b: $\exists t$(Thought t & BEL$'$(a, t) & C(t, *that he$_b$ is Brad*)).

A witness to the quantifier will be a thought whose subject-position sense refers to Brad and whose predicative component is the sense of 'is Brad'. Sample witnesses thus include the thought *that that man in the gorilla suit is Brad* (a thought she does not believe) and the thought *that that man in the photo is Brad* (a thought she does believe).

There is more than one way to relate (4) to (1) and (2). My own preference is to say that it offers a way of reforming these English sentences, justified by the

intuition that they should not really be contradictory. An alternative is to say that (4) reveals the deep logical form of (1) and (2). I see no special reason to make this much bolder claim.

The approach I have offered the Fregean is not isomorphic to the guise-theoretic one, for BEL is three-place whereas BEL′ is two-place. Nonetheless, their motivations are very similar, and the structure in (4) has no fewer places for negation than the version with BEL: there's fully external negation, negation of the believing (i.e. ¬BEL′) and negation in the content. The C-relation is designed to group together just those thoughts or contents that a Millian would not distinguish: they differ only in exploiting different ways of thinking of the same thing. Treating the original de re ascription as involving quantification over this group of thoughts is very similar to invoking quantification over guises.

The score? It's still a tie between Millian and Fregean approaches.

3. Regular Paderewski: Bp & B¬p

> *Hearing Paderewski's wonderful performance at the concert, Peter (a rational subject) comes to believe that Paderewski has musical talent. At the political rally, believing that no politician has musical talent Peter comes to believe that Paderewski lacks musical talent.*

This is Kripke's original puzzle. The structure of our description of Peter's state of believing is:

B*p* & B¬*p*.

So far, we are involved in no contradiction. But Kripke finds Peter puzzling because he takes it that:

> K: anyone . . . is in a position to notice and correct contradictory beliefs if he has them (1979, 122).

Given that Peter is in no such position, a contradiction can be derived.

Guise theory can describe Peter's beliefs so that they are not contradictory in any way that could impugn his rationality. It's true, from the Millian perspective, that there is a Russellian proposition such that Peter believes both it and its negation. But Millians will understand 'contradictory beliefs', as the phrase is used in a principle like K, according to the following rule:

> a subject *s* has contradictory beliefs only if, for some proposition *p*, she meets the following condition:
> $\exists g$ (Guise *g*, BEL(*s, p, g*) and BEL(*s*, ¬*p, g*)).[8]

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[8] If guises relate to whole propositions, it's not clear that a proposition and its negation can be thought of under the same guise. But it's obvious how a guise theorist can make suitable adjustments (e.g. by relating guises to individuals, as in the text that follows).

The fact that for Peter we have Bp and B$\neg p$ does not guarantee that Peter has contradictory beliefs, in the sense specified by the displayed condition. Perhaps in believing that Paderewski has musical talent he is thinking of Paderewski under one guise, but in thinking that Paderewski lacks musical talent he is thinking of Paderewski under a different one:

$\exists g$ (Guise g, BEL(Peter, *that Paderewski has musical talent*, g))
$\exists g$ (Guise g, BEL(Peter, *that Paderewski lacks musical talent*, g)).

On the face of it, therefore, guise theorists need only apply their three-place account to the case to reveal it as one in which Peter does not have rationality-impugning contradictory beliefs. There is simply no puzzle.

A Fregean might mirror this strategy, claiming that Peter uses different senses when thinking about Paderewski on the two occasions. For a Fregean, one thought is contradictory to another iff one contains the other under a sense for negation. On this strategy, Peter's use of different senses to think about Paderewski ensures that his thoughts are not contradictory.

Kripke envisages responses of this kind, and rightly says that they fail to address the puzzle. It's no part of the puzzle to deny that Peter thinks of Paderewski under different guises or using different senses. The puzzle arises from our apparent commitment to the claim that (in addition) he thinks of them under the same guise or sense. Let me develop essentially Kripke's argument for that position, as it remains under-appreciated.

We begin by distinguishing puzzles relating to our reports of Peter's beliefs, and then move to Peter's mental states. One aspect of the puzzle is simply that both belief reports seem to be true: Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent, and Peter believes that Paderewski lacks musical talent. The correctness of these reports is intuitively hard to deny. Let's suppose one reporter, RC, goes to the concert, chats to Peter about the performance, is vividly aware that Peter knows who Paderewski is (he's on stage, and moreover Peter has the program), understands the name 'Paderewski' as used in the context, and shares Peter's view that the performance is magnificent. RC writes in his diary: 'Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent'. The correctness of this report seems utterly beyond challenge. A different reporter, RR, goes to the rally, chats to Peter about the speaker, is vividly aware that Peter knows who Paderewski is (he's on stage, and his name is plastered all over the many frenziedly waving posters), and understands the name 'Paderewski' as used in the context. RR is rather surprised to hear Peter affirm that Paderewski lacks musical talent, questions him carefully, discovers he has been told on good authority that politicians never have musical talent, and Paderewski is manifestly a politician. So RR forms the view that Peter is sincere, and writes in his diary: 'Peter believes that Paderewski lacks musical

talent'. The correctness of this report is also very hard to challenge.[9] But unless these reports are challenged, we have a puzzle. Only an argument that shows one of the reports to be false can make the puzzle go away. No amount of observations about Peter's many guises or senses for Paderewski can as such affect the issue. The kind of response envisaged at the start of this section for Millians and Fregeans is beside the point: it simply fails to address the issue.

RC and RR can both be fully knowledgeable people (or the same person): they may know full well that Paderewski is both a musician and a politician and that Peter has made a mistake. It is *their* use of the term 'Paderewski', not Peter's, that we are presented with when we see the puzzling reports: Bp and B¬p.

In Kripke's presentation, the truth of these reports is guaranteed by the principle of disquotation (cited here with some minor friendly adjustments):

> DQ: If sentence s says that p (in the context), and a normal English speaker who understands s (in that context) sincerely assents to it, then he believes that p (Ib., 112–113).

Those who are unhappy to rely merely on intuitive grounding for the truth of the reports of what Peter believes can appeal to DQ. We cannot be prevented from building Peter's sincere assent to the relevant sentences into the examples, and it is extremely implausible and ad hoc to say that he does not understand them, for he passes every normal behavioral test for understanding. DQ gives us an *argument* for ascribing the contradictory beliefs: Bp & B¬p. Those who wish to pre-empt the puzzle would need to explain what's wrong with DQ.[10]

This presentation of the puzzle focuses on the belief reports, not on Peter, and the reporter (or reporters) of the puzzling reports can be entirely free of ignorance or error, and may certainly be counted as thinking of Paderewski in the same way in both reports. That's what makes Peter's access to many guises or senses for Paderewski beside the point. On this presentation, nothing like guise-theoretic or Fregean semantics is going to speak directly to the puzzle.

Peter's access to many guises or senses has more relevance if we present the puzzle in another way: given the truth of the reports, what mental state could rational Peter be in? Kripke may think we simply cannot answer this question, for we cannot combine his rationality with viewing his mental states as contradictory. It is at this point that many guises or senses may seem to provide help.

However, as already stressed, it's not enough to say that Peter thinks of Paderewski under more than one guise or sense. It must also be maintained that there is no one guise or sense under which he thinks of Paderewski in the relevant beliefs. It is especially hard for a Fregean to find a decent basis for this view. That's

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[9] Using two reporters acting independently blocks attempts to undermine the truth of one of the reports by appeal to contextual updating across the occasions of the reports.

[10] On some accounts of sincerity, DQ will be unimpugnable.

because there is apparently a single sense involved: the Paderewski sense, the one
associated with the public name 'Paderewski'.

Millians cannot merely assert that there is no single guise. Some justification
is required. They may be tempted by this general principle:

> if anyone thinks of an object that it is F, and thinks of the same object that it is not
> F, then he thinks of the object under distinct guises.

But, as we have seen, this is inadequate, for it is consistent with also thinking of
the object under the same guise. What is required is something more like:

> there is no guise g such that a rational subject thinks of an object, under g, that it is
> F, and thinks of the same object, under g, that it is not F.

The problem is justifying the principle. To treat it as a stipulation is like saying that
the theorist just stipulates that there is no Paderewski puzzle, so far as the nature
of Peter's beliefs is concerned. The guise theorist would need directly to refute the
opposing claim that Peter thinks of Paderewski *as Paderewski* on both occasions,
and this is the common guise. Given that guise theorists have had so little to say
about what guises are, they are not in a strong position to deny that there is a single
guise.

Even if we could somehow exploit difference in guise or sense to provide a
satisfying account of Peter's mental state, we are still faced with the problem of the
correctness of the reports: Bp and B¬p. Once we accept this Kripkean datum,
choices for all theorists are highly restricted, and the puzzle ceases to effect any
discrimination between Millian and Fregean approaches. Peter was stipulated to be
rational, and it seems beyond question that he is not in fact in a position to
recognize the contradictory character of his beliefs by mere *a priori* reflection. So
the only element to repudiate in the derivation of the contradiction is K: 'any-
one . . . is in a position to notice and correct contradictory beliefs if he has them'.
And that is precisely what I propose to do, casting my repudiation in a Fregean
manner.

I start by identifying what I call (following an established usage) a 'transpar-
ency' principle:

> T: any rational subject who understands two sentences with the same content
> knows that they have the same content.

If T can fail, then a rational subject can fail to appreciate that two sentences he is
disposed to use to express his beliefs are contradictory, for he can fail to appreciate
that the negated one contains, under negation, a sentence with the very same sense
as the sentence he is disposed to use unnegated. In short, if T is rejected, K can be
rejected.

Rejecting T may seem an unFregean move: are not principles like T constitutive of the notion of Fregean sense? The view I am undertaking to defend is defined by the bulleted theses about sense listed in the introduction, and these do not include or entail transparency. Nothing for which I wish to argue would be affected if I used a word other than 'Fregean' for a theory shaped by those theses together with the denial of T.[11]

Once T and K are abandoned, there is nothing puzzling about the combination of Peter's rationality with Bp and $B\neg p$. We can explain how a rational person might come to have these beliefs: under the impression, which might be rationally acquired even though false, that no politicians have musical talent, Peter takes the Paderewski at the rally to be a different person from the Paderewski at the concert. Hence he incorrectly takes his belief, formed at the concert, that Paderewski has musical talent, to be consistent with his belief, formed at the rally, that Paderewski lacks musical talent. There is nothing irrational about this procedure, though it involves error.

Giving up transparency is not giving up the possibility of awarding different mental states different scores for rationality. I think the story of Peter, as told at the start of this section, can be amplified so as to make his rationality beyond criticism. The amplification essentially depends upon the supposition that it can be rational to believe a falsehood told by a competent witness. That's what makes it rational for Peter to believe that his Paderewski beliefs are consistent: he learned from (someone he knows to be) an A grade informant that no politicians have musical talent, and he has no evidence against this generalization. It guides his belief-formation at the rally.

But now suppose that, at the rally, (someone he knows to be) an AAA grade informant tells him that this politician is a wonderful musician (surprising as that might seem). If Peter does not pause to reconsider, we have good grounds for reducing his ranking as a rational subject. Rationality requires balancing the conflicting testimony (the earlier testimony that no politicians have musical talent, and the later testimony to the effect that this politician is an exception). Peter needs to consider who to trust most. If he does not give the matter thought, he is irrational. If he gives it thought, but comes to the wrong conclusion (favoring the

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[11] Some brief comments about the connection with Frege (1892). The motivations offered at the start of 'On Sense and Reference' are not undermined by abandoning T. It remains that, intuitively, 'Hesperus is Hesperus' is less informative than 'Hesperus is Phosphorus', and that knowing that Hesperus is visible is not the same as knowing that Phosphorus is visible. Nor does the famous paper contain any statement of T, as far as I can discover. Finally, a Fregean could try developing explicit criteria for sameness and difference of sense that do not depend upon T. For example, sentences to which typical speakers adopt different attitudes differ in sense. My own view is that these attempts founder on Mates cases, but that is an entirely different matter. Thanks to Maite Ezcurdia for pressing me on these issues.

A grade informant over the superior AAA grade informant), he is irrational, but less so. If he gives it thought, and comes to the right conclusion (that it's the same Paderewski as at the concert, and that he was mistaken in believing him to lack musical talent), he is wholly rational in so doing.

What guides Peter in these evaluations? There are tricky issues about the evaluation of testimony. But no account of how one should rationally deal with testimony requires T. If Peter assesses the later witness as more reliable, he should come to see that the Paderewski at the rally is quite likely the same Paderewski as the Paderewski at the concert, and so should come to see that his beliefs are quite likely inconsistent. Achieving this does not involve having the capacity stated in T. In general, we can adopt Hume's motto, which is T-free: 'A wise man proportions his beliefs to the evidence'. Peter is wise if he gives the appropriate weight to his witnesses, and makes any changes these weights require.

There may be a feeling that for Peter to know what doxastic changes are required, he needs T-capacities. He does indeed need to respond appropriately to some logical relations: between *Paderewski is a politician with musical talent* and his earlier evidence that *no politician has musical talent*. He needs to see that these cannot both be true, and so he has to choose. This does not require anything as strong as a T-capacity. He just needs to detect the inconsistency in the present case.

The view proposed here is to be distinguished from one that Boghossian considers in just this connection, but firmly rejects:

> A thinker is to be absolved for believing a contradiction, provided that the contra-dictory character of the proposition he believes is inaccessible to mere *a priori* reflection on his part (1994, 49).

The present account can agree with Boghossian that this is to be rejected.[12] It holds that Peter *is* irrational, and is not to be absolved, if he makes no cognitive changes upon hearing the later (AAA) testimony, even though that testimony does not make the contradictory character of his Paderewski beliefs accessible to mere *a priori* reflection; the relevant new information is plainly not *a priori*.

To summarize this section: to take Kripke's puzzle as he intended it is to take it as a case in which Peter has contradictory beliefs in the fullest sense: for the Fregean, contradictory thoughts believed; for the Millian, contradictory proposi-tions believed with no relevant difference of guise. If the puzzle is taken this way, the only stable resolution, as far as I can see, involves rejecting K. I have suggested we should do so by rejecting T. Arguments providing independent justification for

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[12] Thanks to Aidan McGlynn for helping me get clear about this.

this rejection await another occasion. Here I have shown that this rejection need
not undermine our discriminations of rationality in thought.

4. Strengthened Paderewski: B*p* & ¬B*p*

*Hearing Paderewski's wonderful performance at the concert, Peter (a rational
subject) comes to believe that Paderewski has musical talent. At the political rally,
believing that no politician has musical talent Peter comes to believe that
Paderewski lacks musical talent, and does not believe that Paderewski has musical
talent.*

Putting together the first and last elements of this story, we have a contradiction:
Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent and does not believe that
Paderewski has musical talent. This is a contradiction for us (B*p* & ¬B*p*), not for
Peter, and so calls for a treatment different from that given for the regular puzzle.

The case has a straightforward resolution for guise theorists. The later belief is
not properly described using wide-scope negation; rather, it is a case of 'withhold-
ing' belief: under some guise, Peter does not believe that Paderewski has musical
talent. Hence we do not have a contradiction.

This response encounters two problems. The first is the one already noted: as
the puzzle is set up by Kripke, this is a case in which Peter, while no doubt thinking
of Paderewski under different guises, also thinks of him twice under the same
guise. The second is that a guise theorist has to defuse the evidence for holding that
Peter's state is to be described using wide-scope negation. But once this has been
done, the result is equally available to the Fregean: we must simply reject the
'¬B*p*' conjunct of the contradiction. This dialectic will be played out in the
remainder of this section.

Kripke notes the strengthened puzzle, but says little about it. He does, however,
state (though not endorse) a principle that would connect Peter's behavior at the
rally with absence of belief (¬B*p*). With minor rewording, the principle is
'strengthened disquotation':

SDQ: If a sentence *s* says that *p* (in the context), then if a subject understands *s* (in
that context), is not reticent, and is not disposed to sincere reflective assent to *s*, then
the subject does not believe that *p*.

I have argued that Peter understands the sentence 'Paderewski has musical talent',
and we can stipulate that, at the rally, he is not reticent and is not disposed to
sincere reflective assent to it. So, given SDQ, we have the second element of the
contradiction: ¬B*p*.

As Kripke says, SDQ is significantly less intuitive than DQ. The weaker and
more plausible DQ takes us from sincere assent to belief, but offers no link from
any behavior to absence of belief. That's just what SDQ supplies.

SDQ is not merely implausible: it is demonstrably false.[13] To establish this, I'll first consider a related principle:

B: If a subject believes that *p*, then he doesn't believe he doesn't believe that *p*. Schematically: if B*p* then ¬B¬B*p*.

The plan is to show, first, that if B is false, so is SDQ; and then to show that B is indeed false.[14]

Suppose B fails: that is, a subject believes that *p* but believes he does not (B*p* and B¬B*p*). He reflectively scans his beliefs, and, failing to find his belief that *p*, even though it is present, comes to believe he does not believe that *p*. Assuming that the subject understands sentence *s* (where *s* says that *p*), he could sincerely, reflectively and without reticence lack the disposition to assent to *s*. So if B fails, SDQ fails.

Believing that you don't have a given belief (B¬B*p*) makes sincerity consistent with both failure to assent to a sentence that you understand which expresses that belief, and with using that sentence in an act of denial. So if B¬B*p* can consistently combine with B*p*, in other words if B is false, then SDQ is false. We should reject B and hence reject SDQ.

Freud gave classic counterexamples to B. You believe you'd be better off with your father dead, to give you unrestricted access to your mother, but you believe you don't believe this. Most of us believe we don't have racist beliefs, but we may be in for a shock when we visit https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit. Given current mainstream views, I think arguing against B is pushing an open door.

At the rally, Peter believes he does not believe that Paderewski has musical talent, and this can explain his lack of disposition to assent to the relevant sentence, or the presence of a disposition to deny the sentence. If his belief were true, we would have the contradiction. But it's not true. It's a case in which B is false: B*p* but B¬B*p*.

The standard puzzle already requires us to see Peter as making mistakes about his beliefs. For example, he falsely believes that what he came to believe at the concert does not contradict what he came to believe at the rally. There's nothing strange about saying that he has another false belief about his beliefs.

A guise theorist, too, must undermine the case for thinking that Peter's behavior at the rally is properly describable using an ascription of belief with wide-scope negation. This theorist, like everyone else, must reject ¬B*p*.[15] But once this is

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[13] Salmon says "the strengthened version of Kripke's puzzle is a reductio ad absurdum of the quotation principle [SDQ] on which it depends" (1986/1991, 132). Here I give an independent argument against SDQ.

[14] This is close to the strategy adopted, in a similar connection, by Crawford (2004).

[15] "It is strictly incorrect . . . to say that Elmer does not believe that Bugsy is dangerous" (Salmon 1986/1991, 112). In Salmon's story, Elmer plays a comparable role to Peter, and *that Bugsy is dangerous* to *that Paderewski has musical talent*.

rejected, the case is no longer puzzling, and gives no support to guise theory or any other semantic theory. Neither the guise theorist nor the Fregean has a special problem with strengthened Paderewski, and resolving it requires no detailed semantic theses.

5. Agnostic Paderewski: ¬Bp & ¬B¬p, B¬p

Salmon's preferred test case for guise theory involves a believer who comes to be agnostic. In this section we'll do some preparatory work by considering a variant of the Paderewski puzzle that starts with agnosticism.

> *At the concert, Peter (a rational subject), recognizing himself to be ignorant of all things musical, is agnostic: he neither believes that Paderewski has musical talent, nor that Paderewski lacks musical talent. Schematically: ¬Bp & ¬B¬p.[16] At the rally, for familiar reasons (ones requiring no skill in musical appreciation), he comes to believe that Paderewski lacks musical talent: B¬p.*

One option for guise theory (not the one Salmon adopts) is to take the agnostic state as involving wide-scope negation over guises (under no guise does he believe that p and under no guise does he believe that ¬p), and the belief formed at the rally as ending the agnosticism: ¬B¬p drops away, and with it, the contradiction.

On this option, Salmon and Fregeans can join hands. The crucial idea is that Peter's belief states change in a way not recognized in the earlier puzzles. Before, we saw Peter's doxastic activities at the rally as leaving unchanged whatever belief states arose at the concert; in particular, his belief that Paderewski has musical talent persists. On the present option for an agnostic Peter, we regard something that happens at the rally, namely forming the belief that Paderewski lacks musical talent, as removing the lack of belief on this topic that was present at the concert. Of course, if we assume that the cases are in other respects similar, so that Peter does not realize that the Paderewski at the rally is the same as the Paderewski at the concert, Peter will not be in a position to know that his earlier agnosticism has been abandoned: despite the fact that B¬p, he is no doubt in both of the following states: B¬B¬p (reflecting on how things were with him at the concert) and BB¬p (reflecting on how things are with him now, at the rally). This raises no new issues: it's another way in which rational Peter can have contradictory beliefs.

In his own example, however, Salmon (1986/1991, 112) takes agnosticism to be properly represented by the withholding of belief, which is described by an occurrence of a sign for negation in the intermediate position made available by a three-place account. For Salmon, to be agnostic about p involves there being a

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[16] This is not a sufficient condition for agnosticism. Were it sufficient, then I would be properly described as agnostic concerning a whole range of matters to which I have never attended.

guise under which one does not believe that *p* and a guise under which one does not believe that ¬*p*. This poses two questions: can a Fregean mirror Salmon's response, though using senses rather than guises? And is this the right response, or should we treat agnosticism purely in terms of wide-scope negation?

The second question is not important in the present context. I myself tend to think that Salmon's position does not do justice to agnosticism (nor does the simple ¬B*p* and ¬B¬*p* – see footnote 16; second order beliefs are required as well). But even if it does not, we should nevertheless consider the mental state he aims to describe; if we are fussy, we can speak of this state as 'agnosticism*'.[17]

Turning to the first question, a Fregean has the resources to mirror Salmon's position, as follows. A way for Peter to be agnostic (or, if this is not the right word, agnostic*) about whether Paderewski has musical talent is for Peter not to believe a thought C-related to the thought *that Paderewski has musical talent*, and also not to believe a thought C-related to the thought *that Paderewski lacks musical talent*.

∃*t*(Thought *t* & ¬BEL′(a, *t*) & C(*t*, *that Paderewski has musical talent*))
∃*t*(Thought *t* & ¬BEL′(a, *t*) & C(*t*, *that Paderewski lacks musical talent*)).

Any doubts one might have (not unreasonably, in my view) about whether this does proper justice to the notion of agnosticism will extend also to Salmon's position. Once again, we have no reason to assign different scores to Millianism and Fregeanism.

6. Dynamic Paderewski: Bp(1), Bp(2), ¬Bp(1) & ¬B¬p(1) and Bp(2)

Hearing Paderewski's wonderful performance at the concert, Peter (a rational subject) forms the belief that Paderewski has musical talent (Bp). At the rally, Peter believes (on different grounds, and taking himself to be confronted by a different person) that Paderewski has musical talent (Bp again). Later, Peter has a conversation with a music critic that convinces him his own judgments of musical talent are worthless. Reflecting on the concert, he becomes agnostic: ¬Bp & ¬B¬p. But since the belief he forms at the rally (Bp) did not require exercise of musical judgment, he retains it.

As told by Salmon, the story has different protagonists, but here I reproduce the essence of his case drawing on our familiar heroes, Peter and Paderewski.

In 'B*p*(1)', the '(1)' is not part of the content believed, but a reminder that the belief was formed on the first occasion (at the concert). In this variant, Peter, comes to form this same belief again at the rally (perhaps on the basis of testimony, or on the basis of some antecedently held general belief that all politicians have

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[17] We may be reluctant to call someone agnostic about whether Hesperus is visible if they boldly affirm the sentence 'Hesperus is visible', while being reluctant to affirm either the sentence 'Phosphorus is visible' or its negation.

musical talent): that's B$p(2)$. B$p(1)$ = B$p(2)$. The schema '¬Bp & ¬B¬p' imple-
ments a wide-scope conception of agnosticism which, as we saw before, is
not Salmon's. But let's first check to see if the case presents any new difficulty
when agnosticism is thus understood. We'll turn to Salmon's understanding of it
afterwards.

As in the previous puzzle, and unlike the earlier ones, it's natural to think of
Peter as having changed his mind. In particular, his stage 1 belief (B$p(1)$) is finally
repudiated. The new puzzle is this: his stage 2 belief, B$p(2)$, is the very same
belief, yet it is, apparently, not repudiated; a contradiction. So this is more like the
strengthened Paderewski than the regular Paderewski: the contradiction is ours,
not Peter's.

A response consistent with Fregean views is apparent: Peter thinks he has
retained B$p(2)$ when in fact he has not. We can redescribe the case without the
numerical indices: at first, Bp; then Bp is formed anew (on different evidence);
then it is abandoned and the final state is ¬Bp & ¬B¬p, though no doubt
accompanied by some such false belief as: BBp. In short, with agnosticism
understood in the wide-scope way, the familiar pieces just need modest rearrange-
ment. This position does not appear to be refutable.

If agnosticism requires intermediate-scope negation (falling within the outer
quantifier, but outside the content-specifying component), the Fregean can deliver.
Peter's final state is the consistent:

$\exists t$(Thought t & ¬BEL′(a, t) & C(t, *that Paderewski has musical talent*))
$\exists t$(Thought t & ¬BEL′(a, t) & C(t, *that Paderewski lacks musical talent*))
$\exists t$(Thought t & BEL′(a, t) & C(t, *that Paderewski has musical talent*))

The first two formulae mark the agnosticism, and the third the retained belief. The
general point is that Fregeans should welcome the guise theorist's discovery of
intermediate-scope negation, and apply it to Fregean thoughts and senses. Once
this is done, the puzzles of this paper give no grounds for preferring one theory to
the other.

7. Conclusion

Millians originally introduced guises defensively, to deal with phenomena that
seemed to provide strong support to Fregeans. The Millian view was taken to be
correct for other reasons, so the question was not: do Fregeans or Millians best
describe these phenomena? Rather the question was: how can Millians find room
for these phenomena?

In this paper, I have considered matters from a different perspective: although
originating in a defensive move, might not these Millian resources provide solu-
tions to puzzles that Fregeans cannot match? To that question, I have given a

negative answer: to the rather limited extent to which the puzzles described here need the three-place structures distinctive of Millianism, Fregeans can make the relevant distinctions while applying them to senses rather than guises.

In many cases treated in the paper, however, the opposition between these rival semantic theories plays no central role. In treating both the regular and the strengthened Kripke puzzle, what matters is having correct views about rationality, transparency and, connectedly, about how behavior relates to absence of belief. The claims concerning these matters offered in this paper are intended not as consequences of some independently appealing semantic theory, but as claims to which any semantic theory should do justice.*

Appendix

Here are the puzzles in tabular form:

	Puzzle	Guise redescription	Fregean view
1	Lb & ¬Lb	$\exists g(\text{L}'\,b,g)$ & $\exists g\neg(\text{L}'\,b,g)$	Agree; or reject ¬Lb
2	b: B(b is Brad) & b: ¬B(b is Brad)	b: $\exists g(\text{B}'(b$ is Brad, $g))$ & b: $\exists g\neg(\text{B}'(b$ is Brad, $g))$	Agree to a structure giving intermediate-scope negation, but replace guises by senses using the C-relation
3	Bp & B¬p	$\exists g(\text{B}'p,g)$ & $\exists g(\text{B}'\neg p,g)$	No puzzle
4	Bp & ¬Bp	$\exists g(\text{B}'p,g)$ & $\exists g\neg(\text{B}'p,g)$	Reject ¬Bp
5	earlier: ¬Bp & ¬B¬p later: B¬p	$\exists g\neg(\text{B}'p,g)$ & $\exists g\neg(\text{B}'\neg p,g)$ $\exists g(\text{B}'\neg p,g)$	Reject persistence of ¬B¬p; or agree to a structure giving intermediate-scope negation
6	earlier: Bp later: Bp later still: ¬Bp & ¬B¬p	$\exists g(\text{B}'p,g)$ $\exists g(\text{B}'p,g)$ $\exists g\neg(\text{B}'p,g)$ & $\exists g\neg(\text{B}'\neg p,g)$	Reject persistence of Bp; or agree to structure giving intermediate-scope negation

The 'agree' options mark agreement only to a structure which permits a negation of intermediate scope. Fregeans and Millians will disagree about precisely what the structuring relation is, and whether senses or guises are the proper ingredients.
1: Anne's wayward love; 2: Anne's failure to recognize Brad; 3: regular Paderewski; 4: strengthened Paderewski; 5: agnostic Paderewski; 6: dynamic Paderewski.

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