Click on filename to download pdf. Click on "Abstract" to view abstract. I am still working on this page. I have an Academia site, but have recently found it impossible to update the information on it.
The list is arranged under these headings: Forthcoming, Language, Vagueness, Fiction, Other, Reviews; and then by year, starting with most recent.
The list is arranged under these headings: Forthcoming, Language, Vagueness, Fiction, Other, Reviews; and then by year, starting with most recent.
In preparation
"Hume and Kahneman’s dual systems." This paper argues that Hume's distinction between custom and reason anticipates Kahneman's distinction between System 1 and System 2.
"Hume and Kahneman’s dual systems." This paper argues that Hume's distinction between custom and reason anticipates Kahneman's distinction between System 1 and System 2.
Language
2021
Varieties of logical form" in Disputatio. Abstract This began as a response to Andrea Iacona's book, Logical Form, but ended up as an overview of different conceptions of logical form from the syllogistic to DRT.
2020
"Varieties of singular thought. In Singular Thought and Mental Files edited by Rachel Goodman, James Genone and Nick Kroll, OUP, p. 21–37. Revised version uploaded May 2018. Abstract
2017
"Intentional relations." Argumenta 2, 2 (2017):327–39. Abstract.
"Beyond belief". The Philosopher's Magazine 77.2: 76–81. This is an overview of some familiar paradoxes for a non-academic audience. The magazine contains some really interesting articles.
Varieties of logical form" in Disputatio. Abstract This began as a response to Andrea Iacona's book, Logical Form, but ended up as an overview of different conceptions of logical form from the syllogistic to DRT.
2020
"Varieties of singular thought. In Singular Thought and Mental Files edited by Rachel Goodman, James Genone and Nick Kroll, OUP, p. 21–37. Revised version uploaded May 2018. Abstract
2017
"Intentional relations." Argumenta 2, 2 (2017):327–39. Abstract.
"Beyond belief". The Philosopher's Magazine 77.2: 76–81. This is an overview of some familiar paradoxes for a non-academic audience. The magazine contains some really interesting articles.
2015
(with Michael Tye) “Counting concepts: response to Paul Boghossian” in S. Goldberg (ed) Externalism, self-knowledge and skepticism. Cambridge University Press, 2015: 113–8. Abstract
(with Michael Tye) “Counting concepts: response to Paul Boghossian” in S. Goldberg (ed) Externalism, self-knowledge and skepticism. Cambridge University Press, 2015: 113–8. Abstract
“The same name”. Erkenntnis 2015 80.2: 195–214. Abstract
2012
"A very large fly in the ointment: Davidsonian truth theory contextualized." in Richard Schantz (ed) Prospects for Meaning. de Gruyter 2012: 223–258. Abstract
"A very large fly in the ointment: Davidsonian truth theory contextualized." in Richard Schantz (ed) Prospects for Meaning. de Gruyter 2012: 223–258. Abstract
"Representing unicorns: how to think about intensionality." In G. Currie, P. Kotatko, M. Pokorny (eds) Mimesis: Metaphysics, Cognition, Pragmatics. College Publication 2012: 106–31. Abstract
2011
"Speakers of English should use 'I' to refer to themselves." In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed) Self-Knowledge. OUP 2011: 246–60. Abstract
"Speakers of English should use 'I' to refer to themselves." In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed) Self-Knowledge. OUP 2011: 246–60. Abstract
(with Michael Tye)“An originalist theory of concepts”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85, 2011: 101–24. Abstract
2010
"Paderewski variations." Dialectica 2010 64.4: 483–502. Abstract.
"Intentionality without exotica." In Robin Jeshion (ed) New Essays on Singular Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010: 300–18. Abstract.
"Paderewski variations." Dialectica 2010 64.4: 483–502. Abstract.
"Intentionality without exotica." In Robin Jeshion (ed) New Essays on Singular Thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010: 300–18. Abstract.
2009
"Language and meaning". In John Shand (ed) Central Issues of Philosophy. New York: Wiley 2009: 165–76.
"Language and meaning". In John Shand (ed) Central Issues of Philosophy. New York: Wiley 2009: 165–76.
2008
"Fly-swatting: Davidsonian truth theories and context." In Maria Cristina Amoretti and Nicla Vassallo (eds) Knowledge, Language, and Interpretation. On the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Ontos Verlag (Frankfurt) 2008: 33–48. Abstract
"Intensional transitives and presuppositions." Critica 2008 20: 97–109. Abstract
"Philosophical logic." In Dermot Moran (ed) The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy. Abingdon: Routledge 2008: 347–81.
"Fly-swatting: Davidsonian truth theories and context." In Maria Cristina Amoretti and Nicla Vassallo (eds) Knowledge, Language, and Interpretation. On the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Ontos Verlag (Frankfurt) 2008: 33–48. Abstract
"Intensional transitives and presuppositions." Critica 2008 20: 97–109. Abstract
"Philosophical logic." In Dermot Moran (ed) The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy. Abingdon: Routledge 2008: 347–81.
2006
"Understanding as immersion." Philosophical Issues 2006 16: 246–62. Abstract
"Spotty scope." Analysis 2006 66: 17–22. Abstract
"Austerity and openness." In Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald (eds) McDowell and his Critics, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing 2006: 1–14. Abstract
"Facts and free logic." Protosociology 2006 26: 119–27. Abstract
"The essence of reference." In Ernest Lepore and Barry Smith (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Philoosophy of Language 2006: 246–62.
"Understanding as immersion." Philosophical Issues 2006 16: 246–62. Abstract
"Spotty scope." Analysis 2006 66: 17–22. Abstract
"Austerity and openness." In Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald (eds) McDowell and his Critics, Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing 2006: 1–14. Abstract
"Facts and free logic." Protosociology 2006 26: 119–27. Abstract
"The essence of reference." In Ernest Lepore and Barry Smith (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Philoosophy of Language 2006: 246–62.
2005
"Names in free logical truth theory." In José Luis Bermúdez (ed) Thought, Reference and Experience. Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Oxford, Oxford University Press 2005: 66–83. Abstract
"Names in free logical truth theory." In José Luis Bermúdez (ed) Thought, Reference and Experience. Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Oxford, Oxford University Press 2005: 66–83. Abstract
2004
"Referring descriptions." In Marga Reimer and Anne Bezeidenhout (eds) Descriptions and Beyond. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2004: 369–89.
"Option negation and dialethias." In G. Priest and G. Armour-Garb (eds) Logic and Contradiction. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004: 85–92.
"Referring descriptions." In Marga Reimer and Anne Bezeidenhout (eds) Descriptions and Beyond. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2004: 369–89.
"Option negation and dialethias." In G. Priest and G. Armour-Garb (eds) Logic and Contradiction. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004: 85–92.
2002
"Reference and anaphora." In J.Tomberlin (ed) Philosophical Perspectives 16 Language and Mind. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing 2002: 43–71.
"What logic should we think with?" In A. O'Hear (ed) Logic, Thought and Language. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"Reference and anaphora." In J.Tomberlin (ed) Philosophical Perspectives 16 Language and Mind. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing 2002: 43–71.
"What logic should we think with?" In A. O'Hear (ed) Logic, Thought and Language. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2001
"Two ways to smoke a cigarette." Ratio 14 2001: 386–406.
"Sense without reference." In A. Newen, U. Nortmann and R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz (eds) Building on Frege. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications 2001: 211–30.
"Knowing meaings and knowing entities." In U. Meixner and P. Simons (eds) Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age: Proceedings of the 22nd International Wittgenstein Symposium 1999 Vienna 2001: 106–115.
"Two ways to smoke a cigarette." Ratio 14 2001: 386–406.
"Sense without reference." In A. Newen, U. Nortmann and R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz (eds) Building on Frege. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications 2001: 211–30.
"Knowing meaings and knowing entities." In U. Meixner and P. Simons (eds) Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age: Proceedings of the 22nd International Wittgenstein Symposium 1999 Vienna 2001: 106–115.
2000
"Empty names." In Akihiro Kanamori (ed) Proceedings of the World Congress of Philosophy, vol. 6 Analytic Philosophy and Language. Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center 2000: 57–66.
"Empty names." In Akihiro Kanamori (ed) Proceedings of the World Congress of Philosophy, vol. 6 Analytic Philosophy and Language. Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center 2000: 57–66.
1999
"Names, fictional names and 'really'." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 1999: 243–69.
"Names, fictional names and 'really'." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 1999: 243–69.
1998
"Indexicals and reported speech." Proceedings of the British Academy 1998 95: 45–69.
"Indexicals and reported speech." Proceedings of the British Academy 1998 95: 45–69.
1996
"How can some thing say something?". In Ray Monk and David Palmer (eds) Russell and the Origins of Analytic Philosophy Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996, p. 137–153. The original publication uses an incorrect title, of the editors' invention.
"How can some thing say something?". In Ray Monk and David Palmer (eds) Russell and the Origins of Analytic Philosophy Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996, p. 137–153. The original publication uses an incorrect title, of the editors' invention.
Vagueness
2015
"Vagueness and semantic methodology." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2015 90.2: 475–82. Abstract
2013
"Lessons for vagueness from scrambled sorites". Metaphysica 14.1: 225–37. Abstract
2015
"Vagueness and semantic methodology." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2015 90.2: 475–82. Abstract
2013
"Lessons for vagueness from scrambled sorites". Metaphysica 14.1: 225–37. Abstract
1995
“Vagueness, ignorance and margin for error” (Critical Notice of Timothy Williamson, Vagueness.) The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 46.4, 1 December 1995: 589–601
“Vagueness, ignorance and margin for error” (Critical Notice of Timothy Williamson, Vagueness.) The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 46.4, 1 December 1995: 589–601
1990
"Concepts without boundaries". Inaugural lecture delivered at King’s College London, 1990. Reprinted in Rosanna Keefe and Peter Smith (eds) Vagueness: A Reader. Cambridge MA: MIT Press 1996: 251–264.
Fiction
"Concepts without boundaries". Inaugural lecture delivered at King’s College London, 1990. Reprinted in Rosanna Keefe and Peter Smith (eds) Vagueness: A Reader. Cambridge MA: MIT Press 1996: 251–264.
Fiction
2021
"Fictional names: reference, definiteness and ontology". Organon 2021, F28: 44–59. Abstract. Argues for an irrealist view of fictional reference, by showing that we have to accept reference without referents for a wide variety of activities other than fiction (planning, supposing, wondering).
2014
"Fictional worlds and fiction operators." In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero and Genoveva Marti (eds) Empty Representations: Reference and Non-existence. Oxford; Oxford University Press 2014: 277–89. Abstract
"Fictional names: reference, definiteness and ontology". Organon 2021, F28: 44–59. Abstract. Argues for an irrealist view of fictional reference, by showing that we have to accept reference without referents for a wide variety of activities other than fiction (planning, supposing, wondering).
2014
"Fictional worlds and fiction operators." In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero and Genoveva Marti (eds) Empty Representations: Reference and Non-existence. Oxford; Oxford University Press 2014: 277–89. Abstract
2012
"'Of course there are fictional characters'." Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Francesco Orilia (ed) Analytic Philosophy of Fiction 2012.4 262: 615–30. Abstract
2010
"Fiction and acceptance-relative belief, truth and assertion." In Franck Lihoreau (ed) Truth in Fiction. Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt 2010: 137–152. Abstract
Other
2021
"Confronting facts." This paper is forthcoming in a festschrift for Keith Hossack. It suggests a friendly amendment to some claims about knowledge that Keith made in his book The Metaphysics of Knowledge. The suggestion is that to perceive, or to seem to perceive, is to be in a state produced by a system whose function is to enable subjects who possess it to acquire knowledge-of the subject’s environment. It appeals to features of Keith's characterization of knowledge-of.
2019
"Loar on lemons: the particularity of perception and singular perceptual content." In Arthur Sullivan (ed) Sensations, Thoughts, Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar, 2019: 227–47. Link is to draft of December 2018. Abstract.
2007
"A puzzle about how things look." In MM McCabe and Mark Textor (eds) Perspectives on Perception. Frankfurt: Onto Verlag 2007: 7–17. Abstract
2005
"Meeting the hare in her doubles: causal belief, general belief and reason in animals." In Peter Kail and Marina Franca-Spada (eds) Impressions of Hume. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005: 77–94.
"Meeting the hare in her doubles: causal belief, general belief and reason in animals." In Peter Kail and Marina Franca-Spada (eds) Impressions of Hume. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005: 77–94.
2000
"Warrant-transmission, defeaters and disquotation." In E. Sosa and E. Villanueva (eds) Philosophical Issues: Skepticism. 10 2000: 191–200. The same issue of the journal has a response by Wright.
"Warrant-transmission, defeaters and disquotation." In E. Sosa and E. Villanueva (eds) Philosophical Issues: Skepticism. 10 2000: 191–200. The same issue of the journal has a response by Wright.
Reviews
2006
Scott Soames: Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century: Volume 1: The Dawn of Analysis. Philosophical Studies 2006: 637–644
2006
Scott Soames: Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century: Volume 1: The Dawn of Analysis. Philosophical Studies 2006: 637–644
2005
“Pleonastic explanations.” Critical notice: Stephen Schiffer The Things We Mean, Mind 114, 2005: 97–111.
“Pleonastic explanations.” Critical notice: Stephen Schiffer The Things We Mean, Mind 114, 2005: 97–111.
1995
Crispin Wright: Truth and Objectivity, In Philosophy and Phenomenological research 1995 56.4: 899–904.
Crispin Wright: Truth and Objectivity, In Philosophy and Phenomenological research 1995 56.4: 899–904.
1995
“Vagueness, ignorance and margin for error” (Critical Notice of Timothy Williamson, Vagueness.) The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 46.4, 1 December 1995: 589–601
1985
“Evans on reference”. Originally published as “Critical Notice: The Varieties of Reference by Gareth Evans”, Mind 94 , 1985: 120–42.
“Vagueness, ignorance and margin for error” (Critical Notice of Timothy Williamson, Vagueness.) The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 46.4, 1 December 1995: 589–601
1985
“Evans on reference”. Originally published as “Critical Notice: The Varieties of Reference by Gareth Evans”, Mind 94 , 1985: 120–42.