

It is ... an immediate consequence of recognizing names like "Julius" in a language that classical logic must be modified. (Evans 1982: 36)

I

Evans believed that natural languages do or could contain more than one kind of proper name: Russellian names, whose determining characteristic is that to suppose that they have no bearer is to suppose that they have no significance, and descriptive names, whose determining characteristic is that they are introduced by means of a definite description which fixes their reference and which, at least in the early stages, constitutes their "content". In contrast to a Russellian name, a descriptive name may be intelligible while lacking a bearer. From the point of view of systematic semantic theory, Evans thought that a truth theory could do justice to these different kinds of names.¹ A Russellian name would be given an axiom like

1. "Hesperus" refers to Hesperus,

whereas a descriptive name would be given an axiom like

2. for all x ("Julius" refers to x iff $x = \text{Julius}$) (Evans 1979: 184, 1982: 50).

We can imagine "Julius" to have been introduced by a stipulation of the following kind:

Let us use "Julius" to refer to whoever invented the zip (Evans 1979: 181).

There might have been no such person: the zip might have been invented by a committee or might have been a natural phenomenon. These possibilities are not inconsistent with the intelligibility of "Julius". Axiom (2) has to be understood within negative free logic, whose main features are that every simple sentence containing a name with no bearer is false, and that the quantifier rules are restricted.² Evans cites Burge (1974) as a source for free logical truth theories.³ In classical logic, (2) entails that Julius exists (there is an x such that $x = \text{Julius}$), but this inference is not valid within negative free logic. This allows (2) to be true even if "Julius" has no bearer. In that case, " $x = \text{Julius}$ " is false of everything, so if the biconditional is true of everything, "'Julius' refers to x " must be false of everything, which is as it should be. The truth theory as a whole has a single logic, so axioms like (1) will co-exist with axioms like (2) within the free logical structure. Even within free logic the truth of (1) ensures that Hesperus exists, for (1) is a

¹ His preferred form of semantic theory, what he calls "interpretive semantics" (Evans 1976), has a somewhat richer structure, but this makes no difference to the present discussion.

² A "simple" sentence is one consisting of a non-complex n -place predicate concatenated with n referring expressions. If all referring expressions were simple, simple sentences would be atomic sentences. Free logicians wish to avoid excluding complex referring expressions (for example compound names like "Plato and Aristotle" and definite descriptions), so they must make room for the possibility of non-atomic simple sentences.

³ Evans's commitment to the viability of free logic appears elsewhere, for example in his discussion of E-type pronouns (Evans 1977: 124–5) and in his discussion of the contingent apriori (Evans 1979: 195).

simple sentence, one whose truth requires that its names have bearers. So embedding (1) within a free logic does not weaken its logical powers. Both kinds of axiom can lead to homophonic theorems such as

3. “Hesperus is visible” is true iff Hesperus is visible
4. “Julius is tall” is true iff Julius is tall.⁴

In the free logical framework, neither theorem entails that the name has a bearer. Given the restrictions on existential generalization, we can no more infer from (3) that something is Hesperus than we can infer from (4) that something is Julius. So although the free logical framework does not impair the logical powers of axioms for Russellian names, it does impair the logical powers of the relevant theorems.

There is a reason for thinking that this fact prevents a truth theory from doing justice to Evans’s idea. He is committed to the following views: there are or could be both descriptive and Russellian names in a language; these are semantically very different; and interpretation relies upon the appropriate T-sentences. These views are in tension with the fact that the T-sentences do not differentiate between Russellian and descriptive names. In §§2–3 I develop this objection and show how, on Evans’s behalf, it can be met. In §4 I endeavour to explain the origins of Evans’s view that no names are both non-descriptive and non-Russellian.

II

Setting indexicality to one side, a truth theory “serves as” a theory of meaning if following this procedure leads to the correct interpretation of an arbitrary declarative utterance u : first, identify a sentential type, s , to which u belongs, then deduce a T-theorem of the form “ s is true iff p ”; finally, conclude that the speaker, in uttering u , said that p . If you encounter an utterance of “Snow is white” the procedure directs you to identify the sentence uttered (namely, “Snow is white”), use the axioms of your truth theory to derive the T-theorem “‘Snow is white’ is true iff snow is white”, and derive the lemma that the utterance in question is true iff snow is white. Given what you know *about* the truth theory (for example about how it was grounded in the evidence of speaker’s usage), you are then entitled to the final conclusion that the speaker said that snow is white. This is your interpretation of the utterance. Not all true truth theories will lead to correct interpretations. For example, a truth theory which uses the following axiom

5. “Hesperus” refers to Phosphorus

rather than (1) will be no less true than one which uses (1), but it would enable one to derive the T-theorem “‘Hesperus is visible’ is true iff Phosphorus is visible”, which, though true, would wrongly endorse the conclusion that one who has uttered “Hesperus is visible” has said that Phosphorus is visible. (Evans would certainly accept the characterization of this conclusion as wrong, though no doubt this is controversial.) In a form of words of which Evans approves: though neither (1) nor (5) *states* the sense of “Hesperus”, (1) *shows* it whereas (5) does not.

In using a truth theory as a theory of meaning, interpretation arises from what is on the right hand side of the biconditional of a T-theorem. In this classic picture, which Evans endorses, no distinctions of scope regarding names will make for a general

⁴ For details of free logical derivations, see Larson and Segal 1995.

difference in the interpretation of Russellian as opposed to descriptive names. For simple sentences, there is no scope difference for either kind of name. In complex sentences, for example ones containing negation, a user of a descriptive name could legitimately contrast, for example,

6. [Julius] Julius is not tall

with

7. not [Julius] Julius is tall

(using the scope-indicating device Evans offers, borrowed from *Principia Mathematica*⁵). (6) is true only if Julius exists, whereas (7) would be true if “Julius is tall” is false because Julius does not exist. In either case, the conclusion reached by applying the theory in interpretation is not one that entails the existence of Julius. In the ordinary kind of T-theorem, (6) will feature as the right hand side of a biconditional. If there is no such person as Julius it will be false, so, assuming the truth of the T-theory, the left hand side is false, which is as it should be. We do not have the resources to generate a T-sentence which is true only if a contained name refers, so we cannot generate a T-sentence with a profile appropriate to a Russellian name. Likewise, from the fact that the speaker said that [Julius] Julius is not tall we cannot infer that Julius exists. If a name’s Russellian status is marked in object language logical forms by the award of widest scope, then, for such names, we will find only object language sentences like (6), but the requirements of interpretation will not enable us to infer that, for example, Hesperus exists. Although this conclusion is available in the T-theory as a whole, thanks to axioms like (1), it is not made available by the only theorems in the theory that are used in interpretation, the T-theorems. The existence assumption characteristic of a Russellian name does not surface in interpretation. If an utterance is interpreted as containing a name having wide scope, requiring it to have a bearer if the utterance is to be true, this does not reveal whether this is because the name is Russellian or because it is descriptive but used with wide scope; if the latter is the case, the interpretation can be correct (and the T-theorem true) even if the name is empty.

Someone of Evans’s persuasion may well believe that Russellian names sustain a principle which one might call “exportation from within indirect contexts”. The principle would licence the inference from “Jack said that Hesperus is visible” to “Hesperus is such that Jack said that it [Hesperus] is visible”. There is no immediate reason why this principle should not hold even for contexts for which there is no guarantee that substitution of coreferring names preserves truth. Within the classical methodology of truth theories, however, one cannot make use of the principle to mark a difference between the roles played by Russellian and by descriptive names. The pattern of reasoning

someone said that $[n] \dots n \dots$; so $[n]$ someone said that $\dots n \dots$

is not generally valid if descriptive names are in the language, since the premise does not require the name to have a bearer whereas the conclusion does; and whatever kind of

⁵ Compare *Principia Mathematica* p. 69. If A is a formula, so is $[n_1 \dots n_k]A$, for any names, $n_1 \dots n_k$. Occurrences of n_i within A are bound by the scope-marker. The truth of $[n_1 \dots n_k]A$ requires that every name bound by the scope-marker have a bearer; failing that, the sentence is false.

name is used in the object language, the standard way of using a truth theory in interpretation delivers no more than the premise.

If there were nothing more to say, the right conclusion would be, I think, that the weaker logic required by descriptive names has in effect emasculated Russellian names, making their role in interpretation indistinguishable from that of descriptive names with wide scope. This was far from the position that Evans wished to hold.

III

In the classical methodology of truth theories the content made available for interpretation is the complete and self-standing content occupying the p position in the schema “ s is true iff p ”. This simple idea needs to be refined in order to deal with demonstratives. Once this refinement is made, for reasons independent of the present discussion, one can see how a similar refinement could make room for a systematic interpretive and T-theoretic difference between Russellian and descriptive names.

Davidson has suggested that the form of theorems for sentences containing such expressions as “that book” would be along the following lines:

“That book was stolen” is true as (potentially) spoken by p at t if and only if the book demonstrated by p at t is stolen prior to t . (Davidson 1967: 34)

An instance is:

“That book was stolen” is true as (potentially) spoken by Davidson at noon on 02/02/02 if and only if the book demonstrated by Davidson at noon on 02/02/02 is stolen prior to noon on 02/02/02.

Davidson comments that “there is no suggestion that ‘the book demonstrated by the speaker’ can be substituted ubiquitously for ‘that book’ *salva veritate*” (Davidson 1967: 34). But something more damaging to his project is the case: the instance cannot be used in interpretation. Intuitively, it is never correct to report an utterance by Davidson of “That book was stolen” as his having said that the book demonstrated by Davidson at noon on 02/02/02 is stolen prior to noon on 02/02/02. What Davidson actually said by those words does not involve the concept of demonstration, nor the conceptual apparatus used to specify dates. I think that the only way to achieve a correct description of what is said in such a case involves two parts. First, the scene is set by some such remark as “Pointing to a copy of *Word and Object* at noon on 02/02/02 ...”. This gives the necessary background for the interpretation of the demonstrative phrase and the tense of the verb. Next the content is specified relative to that background: Davidson said that it [that book] had been stolen. Putting the two parts together we have the following intuitively correct report:

Pointing to a copy of *Word and Object* at noon on 02/02/02, Davidson said that it had been stolen.

The reporter can use any devices and concepts he wishes in order to set the scene, even ones, as in this case a date and a book title, that were not overtly exploited by the speaker; these then bind the use of pronouns or tenses in the report, ensuring that they have the correct referent, without suggesting that the original speaker himself exploited them. The upshot is that there may be no self-standing sentence, corresponding to the position occupied by p in “ s is true iff p ”, that the reporter can use to express the content of the

speech he correctly reports. Success is achieved in the more complex two-part way.⁶ By the same token, the truth theoretic methodology must be modified. T-theorems usable by an interpreter will need to quantify over utterances rather than merely sentences, and should make room for the two-part form, as in this schema:

8. in uttering u the speaker referred to some object x and time t , and u is true iff ... x ... $f(t)$.

User instructions say something like: find out to what objects and times the speaker referred, and construct a report by first referring to these in your own preferred way, and, applying (8), make those referring expressions govern what replaces “ x ” and “ $f(t)$ ” as they occur after “iff”.⁷

We can use a structurally similar device to secure a distinction, within this refined truth theoretic methodology, between Russellian and descriptive names. The idea is to have two kinds of T-theorem, and associate each with different instructions for those using a T-theory as a theory of meaning. For Russellian names, the T-theorems might follow the pattern:

9. [Hesperus] “Hesperus is visible” is true iff Hesperus is visible
whereas those for descriptive names would follow the weaker pattern:

10. “Julius is tall” is true iff [Julius] Julius is tall.

User instructions for truth theories would be sensitive to this difference of scope. If the theorem contains a name n with widest scope as in (9), then the instruction would be to use the (translation of the) name in reporting what a speaker said, using a report along the following lines: “[n] the utterer said that ... n ...”, where what fills the dots comes from what is to the right of the biconditional in the theorem. If the theorem does not contain a name in widest scope, as in (10), then the user instructions should tell us to accept as conclusion simply: the utterer said that [n] ... n The idea is to mark a Russellian name by awarding it wide scope not merely in the object language sentence, but in the whole of any T-theorem containing a Russellian name, and thus in the proper expression of a metalanguage report of what was said in the object language. By contrast, descriptive names always take less than widest scope in the T-theorems, however wide their scope may be in the object language sentence the theorem addresses. The Russellian/descriptive contrast is represented by wide/narrow T-theoretic scope. The recent discussion of demonstratives is supposed to suggest that there is no special structural pleading here: it may not be possible to contain within the “ p ” position of a classical truth theory the full content of every utterance. Interpretation may require a two-part structure, in which the scene is first set by introducing some entities by expressions upon which the specification of the content is dependent.

If this solution can be made to work, the virility of Russellian names is restored. The existence-requiring axioms now transfer this existence requirement to the T-theorems. In considering how the solution could be implemented within Evans’s approach, we must remember that, according to him, there is a single relation of reference that is absolute as opposed to world-relative. If there are both Russellian and descriptive names, both are related of this single absolute relation of reference. The upshot is, as I will

⁶ Cf. Sainsbury (2002: 137–49).

⁷ The treatment of tense is obviously grossly oversimplified, though in ways irrelevant to the present discussion.

show, that the representation of the Russellian/descriptive distinction in terms of T-sentential scope requires further enrichment of the T-theory.

The compositional axiom for simple sentences states in general how their truth conditions depend upon the contribution of their parts. Evans formulates it as follows:

- (P) If S is an atomic sentence in which the n -place concept-expression R is combined with n singular terms t_1, \dots then S is true iff <the referent of t_1 ... the referent of t_n > satisfies R . (Evans 1982: 49; cf. 1979 184)⁸

He comments: “(P) simultaneously and implicitly defines reference and satisfaction in terms of truth” (Evans 1979: 184, 1982: 49). Even if there is more that can be said to characterize these notions (in terms of how they connect with speakers’ intentions, for example) most people will agree that reference and satisfaction have to make (P) true. As part of the metalanguage, (P) itself is governed by negative free logic. Its definite descriptions (“the referent of t_1 ” etc.) can be understood either as complex referring expressions or as Russellian quantifier phrases, and in either case a question of scope could arise. Using the referential option, the definite descriptions could take wide scope relative to the biconditional:

- [the referent of t_1] ... [the referent of t_n] if S is a sentence in which the n -place concept-expression R is combined with n singular terms $t_1, \dots t_n$ then S is true iff <the referent of t_1 ... the referent of t_n > satisfies R .

Given that, according to Evans, “Julius” refers to its bearer, if any, “in exactly the same sense as that in which a Russellian name refers to its bearer” (Evans 1982: 50), (P), if correct, must hold for both Russellian and descriptive names. The wide scope version clearly cannot hold for an empty descriptive name. Hence the definite descriptions in (P) must always take narrow scope. A more accurate version of (P) is:

- (P) If S is a sentence in which the n -place concept-expression R is combined with n singular terms $t_1, \dots t_n$ then S is true iff [<the referent of t_1 ... the referent of t_n >] <the referent of t_1 ... the referent of t_n > satisfies R .

With this kind of principle governing compositionality, one cannot derive the envisaged kind of wide scope theorems for Russellian names. There is simply nothing in the T-theory to legitimate the derivation of a theorem with a name taking wide scope over “is true iff”.

In keeping with the significance of scope at the T-sentential level, the present proposal can reflect the difference between an axiom for a Russellian name and one for a descriptive name in terms of scope. With the scope indicators in place, (2) above becomes:

11. for all x (“Julius” refers to x iff [Julius] $x =$ Julius) (cf. Evans 1982:50).

Given the natural free logical rules for manipulating scope-indicators, the following is logically equivalent to (1):

12. [Hesperus] for all x (“Hesperus” refers to x iff $x =$ Hesperus).

To use these features of the axioms to generate the required scope distinctions among the T-sentences requires some further rule of inference, perhaps one formulated along these lines:

⁸ Talk of atomic sentences excludes by fiat complex singular terms (which may contain logical connectives and other symbols). In the subsequent reformulation, I tacitly drop the requirement.

13. if “ s is true iff p ” is a theorem, then so is “[$n_1 \dots n_k$] s is true iff p ”, where $n_1 \dots n_k$ are (the translations into the metalanguage of) names contained in “ s ” which are given widest scope in their axioms.

If there are no names in “ s ” which are given widest scope in their axioms, that is if “ s ” contains no names or only descriptive ones, then the scope marker “[$n_1 \dots n_k$]” has no effect. The special rule of inference (13) ensures that only Russellian names allow interpreters to interpret along the pattern: [Hesperus] the speaker said that Hesperus was ... ; or, more idiomatically: concerning Hesperus, the speaker said that it was Descriptive names would always take narrower scope than the T-sentential biconditional, and so would permit at most interpretations like: the speaker said that [Julius] Julius was

This rule of inference (13) is clearly not a valid logical rule in the usual sense, since it identifies a suitable premise not merely in terms of how it is built up out of logical operators and schemata, but also in terms of an occurrence of the non-logical and non-schematic “is true”. The classical idea behind using a truth theory as a theory of meaning is to have axioms that state all the semantic information. This completeness is supposed to be guaranteed by the fact that theorems which suffice for interpretation follow “by logic alone” from the axioms (cf. Evans 1975: 26, where “deductive entailment” introduces the relevant notion). It is no minor adjustment to the methodology of truth theories to allow non-logical rules of inference. However, it is an adjustment which is arguably kin to one needed to accommodate indexicals. A semantic theory could not hope to incorporate sufficient information for interpreting an utterance containing an indexical. An interpreter must bring to bear not only the kind of information which could be recorded in a semantic theory but also such empirical details as who the utterer was, what the time of the utterance was, and what objects were referred to in the utterance. This information could not be stated in any detail in a semantic theory. Even in the simplest kind of case, like the use of “I”, for which a semantic theory might supply the general information that an utterance of “I” refers to the utterer, an interpreter must still have independent knowledge of who the utterer is in order to arrive at an interpretation, and this knowledge is neither supplied by the semantic theory, nor is it purely logical. This is more conspicuous in other cases, for example “that”, where a large range of cognitive skills, sensitive to various contextual factors, may be required for an interpreter to decide what its referent is. There are generalities to be had, of course, but they could not have the detail needed to resolve all particular cases. That a semantic theory should provide all the information needed for interpretation is best seen as a kind of limiting ideal; it is not one to which we can reasonably aspire for natural languages.

If this much is accepted, then the rule of inference (13) can claim a right to appear in a truth theory, despite its non-logical character. It is there to steer the interpretation of a proper subset of the names in a language in an appropriate direction. The basic fact about each such name is recorded in its axiom, in which there is a wide scope metalanguage translation for it; (13) shows how this fact is to impinge upon interpretive practice. There is thus a case for the view that there is no irresolvable tension between suitably refined truth theoretic aspirations and Evans’s idea that a language could contain both Russellian and descriptive names, the latter enforcing a free logic upon both object language and metalanguage. The difference shows up in the way in which the theory reflects the fact that, for Russellian names, the existence of a bearer is guaranteed. Let us say that an

“interpretive” theorem is one that may be truly prefixed by something like “the following sentence states a fact which is guaranteed by meaning or logic alone”⁹. In a correct semantic theory, all the axioms are interpretive in this sense. Whether or not all the theorems are depends on the logic of the truth theory.¹⁰ Existence claims for Russellian names will be interpretive. On reasonable versions of free logic, from something of the form “[*n*] ...” one can infer: “ $\exists x x=n$ ”. The axiomatic status of (12) will ensure the theoremhood (within the free logical truth theory) of “ $\exists x x=\text{Hesperus}$ ”, and this will count as interpretive. It is hard to see how there could be corresponding theorems for (even non-empty) descriptive names, but if there were they would not be interpretive.

In summary, with suitable adjustments, truth theory can make room for the two different kinds of name, Russellian and descriptive, and accord them suitably distinct roles in interpretation. My view is that natural languages do not and could not contain either descriptive or Russellian names. This cannot be argued here.¹¹ Rather, in the section that follows, I will try to uncover the source of Evans’s contrary opinion.

IV

A common view has been that whereas Evans was right to recognize Russellian names, he was wrong to make room for descriptive ones. A name may be introduced by means of a description, but this does not guarantee that its subsequent use is correct only if it conforms to the description. Evans was well aware of this. For example, he writes:

For present purposes, it is not necessary to concern ourselves with the situation that would arise if the name [Julius] became associated with other predicates as a result of discoveries made using the stipulation [that “Julius” is to be used for whoever invented the zip]. We need only consider the simple case—the initial period during which the name is unquestionably a “one-criterion” name. (Evans 1979: 181)

Evans is aware that once the name passes into general currency, there can be no guarantee that the initial reference-fixing description will continue to play its original role. Information accumulates around the name. There may be no mechanism that ensures that some of it will retain the privileged position that it must have in order for it to be a descriptive name. A name like “Deep Throat” may retain its connection with some description like “the source of Woodward and Bernstein’s Watergate-related information”, perhaps in virtue of the fact that all uses of the name defer to Woodward and Bernstein’s. Even in such a case, the connection might come loose. It is a coherent supposition that Deep Throat did not provide all the information that Woodward and Bernstein reported. One could envisage developments of this suspicion properly describable as the suspicion that none of their information came from Deep Throat. This does not appear a manifest contradiction, as it would if “Deep Throat” retained its

⁹ This formulation is intended to secure acceptance from those who do not think that logical axioms are guaranteed by the meanings of the logical constants.

¹⁰ The usual assumption is that it will not hold in general, since there will normally be theorems “*p* iff *q*”, interpretive theorems “*s* is true iff *p*” and uninterpretive ones “*s* is true iff *q*”. However, Larson and Segal (1995) have proposed that given a sufficiently weak version of free logic, every theorem can be interpretive.

¹¹ Sainsbury (2005) tries to justify this claim.

meaning and its envisaged descriptive connection. Likewise, given the passage of time, it will be in order for someone to speculate without contradiction that perhaps Julius did not really invent the zip, but merely posed as the inventor; and then for people to speculate that he did not even do that, and that the attribution to him of the invention was a result of a historian's mistranscription.¹² Nothing the person who introduced the name can do could prevent such developments. Were they to occur, we would have a name which is neither descriptive nor Russellian: not descriptive, since there is no description determining which object is the referent of the name (cf. Evans 1979: 180); and not Russellian, since neither the way in which the name was introduced, nor anything in its subsequent history, could guarantee that it had a bearer. This category of names, the non-descriptive and non-Russellian, is, I believe, precisely the one to which most natural language names should be assigned. They are often introduced by description, in a way that does not guarantee that they have a bearer; yet what it is irresistibly natural to classify as the same name, with its meaning unchanged, may cease to be associated with the original description, whether as determiner of reference or as determiner of what an interpreter needs to know.

Rather than defend the claim that most natural language names are neither Russellian nor descriptive, I wish to speculate about why, among so many varieties of singular term that Evans discusses, he makes no room for the category of non-descriptive and non-Russellian. One explanation that applies to many theorists does not apply to Evans: in the grip of the assumption that classical logic supplies all the necessary semantic categories for a proper description of natural language, singular terms can correspond either to individual constants, and so be Russellian names, or to definite descriptions (understood in Russell's way), and there are no other options. Negative free logic breaks this classical straightjacket, making room for non-descriptive yet non-Russellian singular terms. Since Evans was familiar with, and sympathetic to, negative free logic, this line of thought provides no explanation for his failure to recognize this semantic category.

A better explanation attends to the means which Evans thought were available for explaining how various uses of a given name are unified. They could be unified by an object to which all uses relate, or by a description which all uses invoke; no third option is recognized, a restriction which in turn (I will argue) is to be accounted for by a residual internalism in Evans's thought. The demand for unification is at work in his discussion of a remark by David Wiggins:

To know the sense of n is to know to which entity n has been assigned, a single piece of knowledge which may be given in countless different ways by countless different descriptions. (Wiggins 1975: 11)

Evans comments:

The view expressed by Wiggins leads to the claim that ordinary proper names are Russellian There must be something that unifies them [*sc.* the "countless different descriptions"], and this can only be the fact that they are all ways of identifying the same object But, given the close semantical connection

¹² This view of the relation between names and descriptions resembles one of two apparently opposed views discussed by Searle (1958), and whose main feature is, I think, supposed to be retained in his eventual synthesis.

between a descriptive name and a description, no such problem [of unification] arises ... (Evans 1979: 181)

Evans considers an alternative way in which uses might be unified: by the *source*, in the “journalistic sense”, of the invoked information. He points out that even if having a source in common provides a sufficient condition for understanding, it does not provide a necessary one: in this sense of “source”, a hearer may correctly interpret a speaker even if there is no single source responsible for both speaker’s and hearer’s information. The reader is left to conclude that there are no appropriate further ways of providing necessary and sufficient unifying conditions for understanding, so that the Russellian status of all non-descriptive names is secured.

As Evans was aware, there are alternatives, for example those based on the idea that, at least once all mundane issues are set aside (for example, that the hearer has heard the speaker correctly), it is necessary and sufficient for understanding that the use made of the name by the speaker should belong to the same name-using practice as the use brought to bear by the hearer in the act of putative understanding. There is more than one way to say what it is for two uses of a name to belong to the same name-using practice. Evans in another context discusses the Kripkean “Causal Theory”, the view that “the denotation of a name in a community is ... to be found by tracing a causal chain of reference preserving links back to some item” (Evans 1973: 10)¹³. Bearing in mind that the same name (as normally individuated) can be used of many different things, we can re-express this as a view about the individuation of name-using practices: a use belongs to a single practice, *P*, iff either it is the event which introduced the name of the referent of the practice, and so inaugurated that practice, or else descends from that introduction by a series of links which preserve reference. Although this Kripkean position is consonant with the view that names are Russellian, it can be modified into a view which allows non-descriptive names to be empty by removing mention of the referent: a use belongs to a single practice, *P*, iff either it is the event which introduced the name, and so inaugurated that practice, or else it descends from that introduction by a series of links which would preserve reference (if any). If some account of this sort is correct, the various uses of a name in which various different descriptions are brought to bear can be unified without reliance upon an object to which all relate: they all belong to a single name-using practice. We will see that Evans’s residual internalism plays a part in his rejection of views of this kind.

In the earlier paper (1973), though not in the book (1982), Evans offers arguments against such theories. For example, he says, “Change of denotation is ... decisive against the Causal Theory of Names” (Evans 1973: 11). I have suggested elsewhere (Sainsbury 2002: 220–2) that this is not in fact decisive: an alternative and indeed preferable

¹³ The usual caveat about the supposition that this is a theory Kripke did or would endorse needs to be entered. Evans’s formulation, perhaps unintentionally, suggests that the Causal Theory would offer a way of in practice telling which object the bearer of a name is. An alternative view is that the theory might offer an account of what makes something the referent of a name without suggesting that in practice we should find out which object the referent is by applying the theory. The fact that we use associated descriptions as evidence, in determining to which practice a use of a name belongs, may wrongly have given encouragement to descriptive theories of what names mean.

description of such cases is not that there is a single practice with first one and then another referent, but that there are successive practices each with a distinct referent. His other attacks against the causal theory are similarly inconclusive. For example, a Kripkean can endorse Evans's view that "There is something absurd in supposing that the intended referent of some perfectly ordinary use of a name ... could be some item utterly isolated (causally) from the user's community and culture" (Evans 1973: 12). Introducing a name that in fact has a bearer involves a causal relation between the bearer and the introducer. The result is that a use standing in the appropriate causal relation to a normal (non-fictional) successful introduction is thereby a use causally related to the referent.

If Evans's detailed arguments against such theories were decisive, one would have a satisfying explanation for his supposition that the categories of Russellian and descriptive are non-empty and exhaustive. I think, however, that an explanation can be found at a deeper level. Despite his advocacy of some aspects of a generally externalist picture of the mind, in particular his insistence that, however it might seem to the subject, no thought is expressed by the use of a sentence containing a name with no bearer, internalism retains some hold on him. This is manifest in his discussion of the steel balls. Considering the case in which the subject, through amnesia, has forgotten everything about one of two similar steel balls he saw earlier, Evans writes:

There is no question of his recognizing the ball; and there is nothing else he can do which will show that his thought is really about one of the two balls (about *that ball*), rather than about the other. The supposed thought—the supposed surplus over the *ex hypothesi* non-individuating descriptive thought—is apparently not connected to anything. (Evans 1982: 115)

The general line is that if the subject were thinking about one of the balls, there should be something within the inner aspects of a subject's thought, and not merely the external causal fact, which makes this so. Indeed, Evans commits himself to something stronger: there needs to be something that the subject can *do* which will *show* which ball he is thinking about. These are clearly internalist views. The general principle is that one who can refer in thought can do something that shows that he does, rather as, for some internalists, one who is justified can show that she is. Here, perhaps, we find the deep root of Evans's interpretation of Russell's Principle as a highly demanding one. Whereas everyone can accept some interpretation of the mantra that one who refers must know to whom or what she refers, in Evans's hands the principle comes to require from the thinker the capacity to distinguish the referent from all other things. Reference is to be determined by facts "within" the speaker, and so in some sense accessible to the speaker, rather than by the mere impact of causal forces, or mere immersion in a name-using practice.

Evans is happy to allow that information possessed by the thinker can help determine the object of her thought. There is some indication that he views a thinker as automatically in possession of the relevant properties of information possessed. He discusses the following example:

Do you remember that bird we saw years ago? I wonder whether it was shot.
(Evans 1982: 308)

Evans says that the hearer does not fully understand the speaker "until he *remembers* the bird—until the *right* information is retrieved". But how can remembering the bird be glossed in terms of retrieving the "right" information? Evans would agree that it is not

enough to entertain merely predicative information, expressible as, for example, “was crimson”, however detailed this is, and even if it happens to be true of the right bird. The information is “right” only in virtue of being causally derived from the right object, that is, the bird in question. This means that talk of the right information does nothing to advance the project of saying what it is to remember the bird. Evans’s gloss suggests that, momentarily, he supposed otherwise; which in turn suggests, I believe, that he was tempted to try to internalize the external fact of causation in terms of internal states of information possession. Had Evans been happy with information possession characterized externalistically, the “right” information could be described simply as information originating in that bird.

The internalist aspect is only lightly camouflaged by the importance Evans assigns to the origin, rather than the fit, of information associated with a name in determining the referent. Since origin is a causal notion, externalists may think that justice is being done to their position. But since the relevant information is supposed to be accessible to the thinker, there is a sense in which something accessible to the thinker plays an instrumental part in determining her referent. A pure externalist, by contrast, will be happy to see the determination as fixed by facts that are not independently internally accessible, for example by immersion in a practice. The causal relation will make the referent an object of thought for the thinker, but not necessarily in virtue of any further fact about the non-relational organization of the thinker’s mind.

To point this out is not, as such, to provide a reason for thinking that Evans was misguided to retain these internalist strictures. On the other hand, if they lead to the view that every name is either Russellian or descriptive, a dispassionate look at the actual facts of our linguistic practice will, I believe, give us reason to reject them.¹⁴

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