Abstract: The aim of this paper is to show that we cannot deepen our understanding of fiction, or of fiction operators, by appeal to fictional worlds. First, I show that there are many different fiction operators, with different truth conditions. (For example, “In War and Peace, there are real as well as purely fictional characters” is true, but “According to War and Peace, there are real as well as purely fictional characters” is false.) It follows that no one worlds-based account can be right for all of them. Secondly, I show that some fictional operators place specific requirements on the actual world, and so cannot be analyzed purely in terms of how things are in nonactual worlds. (Example: “Most readers of Pride and Prejudice find that Elizabeth Bennett is charming”.) Thirdly, I show that worlds-based accounts cannot avoid epistemic circularity: determining which worlds are appropriate requires first attaining an interpretation of the fiction.