

This paper considers how a Davidsonian could respond to a wide variety of alleged and genuine contextual effects. These effects are of very different kinds, and a Davidsonian needs appropriately different responses. The range of cases runs from fairly contained issues concerning the contextual sensitivity of standard indexical expressions, to radical claims that all utterances are context dependent in a way that threatens to undermine traditional conceptions of semantics. Context sensitivity of the former kind can, I suggest, be accommodated by methods that are now fairly familiar. Radical claims to the effect that global context sensitivity prevents any utterances from having stateable truth conditions need to be addressed, since if they are correct, anything like Davidson's project is hopeless. In addition, there are a wide variety of words and phrases which have been claimed to be context sensitive ("red", "ready", "tall"), and which one cannot assume should be treated in the same way. Finally, there are inferences ("bridging inferences") which have been used as evidence for more widespread form of contextual dependence. The paper stresses the variety of the cases, and the corresponding variety of appropriate responses. The conclusion of the paper is that none of the examples and arguments considered constitute a reason for abandoning an essentially Davidsonian approach to semantics.