

Abstract. Singularity in thought can be marked in many non-equivalent ways. Theses using the notion of singularity are thus best refashioned, so as to use instead the notions involved in one of the more precisely formulated marks. For example, one can ask whether every thought built round a simple nominative concept has object-involving truth conditions, where the italicized phrases allude to different marks of singularity. I say the answer is No. Or we can ask whether any thought involving a non-empty mental file referring to an object can be thought only by a thinker who is acquainted with that object. Again, I answer negatively. On the positive side, I endorse Harman's proposal that every thought built round a simple non-empty nominative concept has object-involving truth conditions. The converse does not hold, even in restricted form, since plurally object-involving truth conditions are often thought by means of complex nominative concepts (like list concepts or complex numeral concepts).