Vagueness and semantic methodology This is a contribution to a symposium on Diana Raffman’s book *Unruly Words*. The main question it addresses is how one can exploit the way we use vague expressions to determine a semantic theory. For Raffman, the crucial relevant feature of use is the license we have to apply or deny vague predicates in borderline cases. This makes it sound as if we can truly either apply or deny the predicate in these cases, which threatens to be contradictory. Raffman’s solution appears to be to relativize truth to “ranges”, which are structurally somewhat like precisifications (though differently motivated). The application of ranges, and their connection with truth, raises several issues, some similar to ones familiar from discussions of supervaluations. For example, it seems to be a consequence of Raffman’s view that, in a sorites series for F, it is true relative to every range that some F has a non-F adjacent to it in the series.