

Degrees

BA (Oxon.): 1964, PPE, as scholar of Corpus Christi College, Oxford
DPhil (Oxon.), MA (Oxon.): 1970

Honors

Fellow of the British Academy
Fellow of King's College London
Honorary Fellow, Corpus Christi College, Oxford

Main appointments

1968–70: Magdalen College Oxford (Radcliffe Lecturer in Philosophy)
1970–73: St Hilda's College Oxford (Lecturer in Philosophy)
1973–75: Brasenose College Oxford (Radcliffe Lecturer in Philosophy)
1975–78: University of Essex (Lecturer in Philosophy)
1978–84: Bedford College (University of London) (Lecturer in Philosophy)
1984–87: King's College London (Lecturer in Philosophy)
1987–89: King's College London (Reader in Philosophy)
1989– 2008: King's College London (Susan Stebbing Professor of Philosophy)
2002– : University of Texas at Austin (Professor of Philosophy)

Publications

Books

1. *Russell* RKP, 1979: The Arguments of the Philosophers Series, 348pp; paperback edition, 1985. Hardback reissued 1999.

In keeping with the aims of the series, the book's primary objective is to present a critical assessment of Russell's views and of his arguments for them.

2. *Paradoxes* CUP, 1988: cloth and simultaneous paperback, vii + 163pp. Second edition 1995, third edition 2009 (with an additional chapter on moral paradoxes).

I wrote this book in the belief that people other than professional philosophers would find even quite technical topics in philosophy interesting if they were appropriately presented. In some cases, the level of my discussion rises to more or less the current state of the art, but I hope my initial presentation of the problems is simple and clear enough to stimulate interest among non-philosophers. Translated into German and Japanese in 1992.

3. *Logical Forms* Basil Blackwell, 1991: 398p, cloth and simultaneous paperback. Reprinted four times. Second edition 2000.

The book is designed as a textbook in philosophical logic, though it incorporates, both in its plan and in detail, my own views on the topics discussed.

4. *Departing from Frege: Essays in Philosophical Logic*. Routledge, 2002. This is a collection of mostly previously published essays in the philosophy of language. The new essay serves as an introduction and gives the volume its title.

5. *Reference Without Referents* OUP 2005. This book argues for the view that reference features in semantics as reference conditions, which may or may not be satisfied. Paperback 2007.
6. *Fiction and Fictionalism*. Routledge 2009. The book reviews various ways to be realist about fictional objects (they are nonexistent, or nonactual or nonconcrete), but argues for an irrealist approach. This is to the good from the point of view of fictionalist theories, though some of these (notably fictionalism about modality and fictionalism about morality) suffer from other problems.
7. with Michael Tye: *Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts*. Oxford University Press, 2012. Paperback 2013.

Articles

1. "Semantics by proxy" *Analysis*, 38, 1977: 86–96.
2. "Logical form, perspicuity and first order languages" *Journal of Philosophy*, 74, 1977. Abstract of a paper presented to the American Philosophical Association, Washington, December 1977.
3. "Understanding and theories of meaning" *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 80, 1979:127–44.
4. "Benevolence and evil" *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 58, 1980: 128–134.
5. "Semantic theory and grammatical structure" *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume* 96, 1980: 159–172.
6. "Russell on constructions and fictions" *Theoria*, 46, 1980: 19–36.
7. "On a Fregean argument" *Analysis*, 43, 1983: 12–14.
8. "Rejoinder to Rasmussen" *Analysis*, 44, 1984: 111–113.
9. "Saying and conveying" *Linguistics and Philosophy*, 7, 1984: 415–32.
10. "What are the data for semantics?" in G. Simon and J-M. Vienne, eds, *Mythes et Réalités de l'Activité Scientifique* (Proceedings of the 3rd Anglo-French Colloquium), 1985, Université de Lille III.
11. "Evidence for Meaning" *Mind and Language*, 1, 1986: 64–82.
12. "Russell on acquaintance" in Godfrey Vesey, ed., *Philosophers Ancient and Modern*, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series, 20, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986: 219–44.
13. "Degrees of belief and degrees of truth" *Philosophical Papers*, 15, 1986: 97–106.
14. "Tolerating vagueness" *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 89, 1988: 33–48.
15. "On Induction and Russell's Postulates" in Wade Savage and Anthony Anderson, eds, *Re-reading Russell: Essays on Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics and Epistemology* (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science XII) Minnesota: Minnesota University Press, 1989: 200–219.
16. "What is a vague object?" *Analysis*, 49, 1989: 99–103.
17. "Concepts without boundaries" London: King's College London, 1990, 22pp. (Inaugural lecture) Reprinted in Rosanna Keefe and Peter Smith (eds) *Vagueness: A Reader*, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1996: 251–264.
18. "Russell et l'expérience directe" (tr. François Clementz) *Hermès*, 7, 1990: 119–143.
19. "Is there higher order vagueness?" *Philosophical Quarterly*, 41, 1991: 167–182.
20. "Cartesian possibilities and the externality and extrinsicness of content" *Synthese* 89, 1991: 407–424.
21. "Russell" in J. Dancy and E. Sosa, eds, *Companion to Epistemology*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1992: 450–452.
22. "Sorites paradoxes and the transition question" *Philosophical Papers* 21.3, 1992: 177–189.

23. "Russell on names and communication" in Andrew Irvine and Gary Wedeking, eds, *Russell and Analytic Philosophy*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993: 3–21.
24. "Russell" in Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa, eds, *Companion to Metaphysics*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995: 446–50.
25. "Pojmy Bez Kranic", *Filosoficky Casopis*, 2, 1995: 186–205. (Polish translation of 17)
26. "Why the world could not be vague" *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 33, 1995: 63–81.
27. "Frege and Russell" in Nicholas Bunnin and E. P. Tsui–James, eds, *Introduction to Philosophy*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996: 662–677.
28. "Philosophical Logic" in Anthony Grayling, ed, *Philosophy: A Guide Through The Subject* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996:61–122.
29. "Vagueness, ignorance and margin for error" (Critical Notice of Timothy Williamson, *Vagueness*.) *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, 46, 1996: 589–601.
30. "How can some thing mean something?" in Ray Monk and Anthony Palmer, eds, *Bertrand Russell and the Origins of Analytic Philosophy*, Bristol: Thoemmes, 1996: 137–53. (This version misprints the title as "How can we mean something?". The correct title is given in my collection *Departing From Frege*.)
31. "Fregean indexicals" in Christian Stein and Mark Textor, eds, *Intensional Phenomena in Context: Papers from the 14th Hamburg Colloquium on Cognitive Science*, Hamburg: GrKK, 1996: 91–105.
32. "Reporting indexicals" in Mark Sainsbury, ed, *Thought and Ontology*, Milan: FrancoAngeli, 1997: 161–172.
33. "Can rational dialetheism be refuted by considerations about negation and denial?", *Proto Sociology: An International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research*, 10, 1997: 215–228.
34. "Fregean sense" in Timothy Childers, Petr Kolář and Vladimír Svoboda, eds, *Logica '96*, Prague: Filosofia 1997: 261–276.
35. "Sorites" (with Timothy Williamson) in Crispin Wright and Bob Hale, eds, *Companion to Philosophy of Language*, Oxford: Blackwell 1997: 458–484.
36. "Hume's idea of necessary connection" *Manuscrito* 20, 1997: 213–230.
37. "Easy possibilities." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 57, 1997: 907–919.
38. "Il naturalismo di Hume" (trad. Gianmatteo Mameli) in Evandro Agazzi and Nicla Vassallo, eds, *Introduzione al Naturalismo Filosofico Contemporaneo*, Milan: FrancoAngeli, 1998: 266–294.
38. "Projections and relations" in Barry Smith and Peter Menzies, eds, *Secondary Qualities Generalized*, *The Monist*, 81.1, 1998: 133–160.
39. "Indexicals and reported speech" *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 95, 1998: 45–69.
40. "Names, fictional names and 'really'", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume*, 1999: 243–69.
41. "Warrant-transmission, defeaters and disquotation" in Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva (eds) *Philosophical Issues: Skepticism*, 10, 2000: 191–200.
42. "Empty names" in Akihiro Kanamori, ed., *The Proceedings of the World Congress of Philosophy, Vol. 6 Analytic Philosophy and Logic*, Bowling Green: Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000: 57–66.
43. "Knowing meanings and knowing entities" Uxe Meixner and Peter Simons (eds) *Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age: Proceedings of the 22nd International Wittgenstein Symposium*, 1999, Vienna, 2001: 106–115.

44. "Sense without reference". In A. Newen, U. Nortmann and R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz (eds), *Building on Frege*, Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications, 2001: 211–30.
45. "Two ways to smoke a cigarette". *Ratio* 14, 2001: 386–406.
46. "Realism vs nominalism about the dispositional/non-dispositional distinction" in Michele Marsonet, ed., *The Problem of Realism*, Ashgate, 2002: 160–73.
47. "Logica filosofica." In Franca d'Agostini and Nicla Vassallo (eds) *Storia della filosofia analitica*, Einaudi 2002.
48. "What logic should we think with?" In Anthony O'Hear (ed.) Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture Series, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
49. "Reference and anaphora" *Philosophical Perspectives*, 16, *Language and Mind*, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing 2002: 43–71.
50. "Graziosi topi rosa: allucinazione e contenuto percettivo" in Claudia Bianchi, and Andrea Bottani (eds) *Ontologia e significa*, FrancoAngeli 2003: 173–87.
51. "Option negation and dialethias". In G. Priest and G. Armour-Garb (eds) *Logic and Contradiction* OUP 2004: 85–92.
52. "Sameness and difference of sense." *Philosophical Books* 45, 2004: 209–217.
53. "Referring descriptions." In Marga Reimer and Anne Bezuidenhout, eds, *Descriptions and Beyond*, Oxford, Clarendon Press 2004: 369–89.
54. "Meeting the hare in her doubles: causal belief, general belief and reason in animals." In Peter Keil and Marina Franca-Spada (eds) *Impressions of Hume* Oxford, Oxford University Press 2005: 77–94.
55. "Names in free logical truth theory." In José Luis Bermúdez (ed) *Thought, Reference and Experience. Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans*. Oxford, Oxford University Press 2005: 66–83.
56. "Spotty scope." *Analysis* 66, 2006: 17–22.
57. "Understanding as immersion." *Philosophical Issues* 16, 2006: 246–62.
58. "Austerity and openness." In Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald (eds) *McDowell and his Critics*, Blackwell Publishing, Malden MA, 2006: 1–14.
59. "The essence of reference". In *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language*, edited by Ernest Lepore and Barry Smith, Oxford 2006: 393–422.
60. "Facts and free logic." *Protosociology* 26, 2006: 119–27.
61. "A puzzle about how things look." In MM McCabe and Mark Textor (eds) *Perspectives on Perception*. Ontos Verlag (Frankfurt) 2007: 7–17.
62. "Philosophical logic." *The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy*, ed Dermot Moran, Abingdon, Routledge 2008: 347–81.
63. "Fly swatting: Davidsonian truth theories and context." In Maria Cristina Amoretti and Nicla Vassallo (eds) *Knowledge, Language, and Interpretation. On the Philosophy of Donald Davidson*. Ontos Verlag (Frankfurt) 2008.
64. "Language and Meaning". In John Shand (ed) *Central Issues of Philosophy*. Wiley (New York) 2009: 165-76.
65. "Intensional transitives and presuppositions" *Critica* 40, 2008: 129-39.
66. "Intentionality without exotica". In Robin Jeshion (ed) *New Essays on Singular Thought*. OUP 2010: 300–318.

67. "Paderewski variations." *Dialectica* 64.4, 2010: 483–502.
68. "Fiction and acceptance-relative truth, belief and assertion". In Franck Lihoreau (ed) *Truth in Fiction*. Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt 2010: 137–152.
69. "English speakers should use 'I' to refer to themselves." In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed) *Self-Knowledge*. OUP 2011: 246–60.
70. (with Michael Tye) "An originalist theory of concepts". *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 85, 2011: 101–24.
71. "A very large fly in the ointment: Davidsonian truth theory contextualized." In Richard Schantz (ed) *Prospects for Meaning*. De Gruyter (Berlin) 2012: 223–257
72. "Representing unicorns: How to think about intensionality." In G. Currie, P. Kotatko, M. Pokorný (eds) *Mimesis: Metaphysics, Cognition, Pragmatics*. College Publication 2012: 106–31
73. "Of course there are fictional characters." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie: Analytic Philosophy of Fiction*. 4, 2012: 615–630
74. "Lessons for vagueness from scrambled sorites." *Metaphysica* 14.1, 2013: 225–37.
<http://www.springerlink.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1007/s12133-013-0123-4>
75. "Fishy business". *Analysis* 2014: 1–3.
76. "The same name". *Erkenntnis*, special issue on proper names, 2014:
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9705-y>
77. "Fictional worlds and fiction operators". In *Empty Representations: Reference and Non-Existence*. Edited by Manuel García-Carpintero and Genoveva Martí. Oxford University Press 2014: 277–289.
78. "Vagueness and semantic methodology." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 2015.

Selected Reviews

1. Critical Notice: "Gareth Evans: *The Varieties of Reference*," *Mind*, 94, 1985: 120–142.
2. "Crispin Wright: *Truth and Objectivity*." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 56.4, 1995: 899–904.
3. "Vagueness, ignorance and margin for error." *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 46, 1995: 589–601.
4. "Pleonastic explanations." Critical notice of Stephen Schiffer's *The Things We Mean*, *Mind* 114, 2005: 97–111.